fingerprintBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Thomas E. Ahlering, and Alex W. Karasik 

Seyfarth Synopsis:  In a class action alleging that the criminal background policy of Washington D.C.’s local transit authority had a disparate impact on African-Americans, a federal district court recently certified three classes of African-American employees and applicants despite the employer’s workforce being 75% African-American. The ruling – in Little v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, No. 14-1289, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48637 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2017), is a “must read” for employers that use hiring screens.

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One of the hottest areas in workplace class actions involves criminal background checks used by employers.  On one end of the spectrum, employers want to be sure they are not subjecting their businesses, employees, and clients to any potential criminal conduct by their own workers.  On the other hand, many prospective employees with criminal backgrounds may have been adequately rehabilitated through the criminal justice system and merely need an opportunity to prove they can be counted on as an employee.  In Little v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, No. 14-1289, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48637 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2017), Plaintiffs alleged that a criminal background check policy used by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) to screen candidates and employees was facially neutral, but had a disparate impact on African-Americans.  After the Plaintiffs moved for class certification , Judge Collyer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted Plaintiffs’ motion in part and certified three classes pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4), finding that Plaintiffs had satisfied Rule 23’s requirements with respect to liability and the availability of injunctive or other declaratory relief, but that the proposed classes failed to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) because the case involved “more than just the individual determination of damages.”  Id. at *65. 

The Little ruling puts employers on notice that even if their workforce is predominately made up by one protected class, their criminal background policies can still be challenged as having a disparate impact on that class for purposes of class certification.

Case Background

WMATA, the primary public transit agency for the Washington D.C. metropolitan region, adopted its Policy 7.2.3 to govern how and when individuals with criminal convictions can obtain or continue employment with WMATA and its contractors and sub–contractors.  Id. at *4-5.  Plaintiffs alleged that although the policy was facially neutral, it had a disparate impact on African-Americans.  WMATA argued that the policy was adopted as a business necessity.  Id. at *6.  Further, WMATA  argued that the make-up of its employee and contractor workforce, which included 12,000 individuals, was 75% African-American, thus demonstrating that no discrimination occurred.

Plaintiffs moved for certification of a hybrid Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) class, seeking both injunctive and individual monetary damages for the alleged discriminatory policy.  Id. at *16.  Alternatively, if the Court determined monetary damages were not suitable for class-wide determination, Plaintiffs proposed certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for liability and injunctive relief determinations and the application for Rule 23(c)(4) to allow the question of liability to be answered on a class-wide basis (but with individual hearings on damages owed to each specific class member).

The Court’s Decision

The Court held that certification was proper under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(c)(4) and certified three classes for a determination of liability and injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), but withheld any individual damages determinations.  Id. at *46.  Beginning with its Rule 23(a) analysis, the Court first noted that as WMATA did not dispute Plaintiffs’ assertion that the overall class included over 1,000 individuals, and each sub–class included at least 200, the Court found that Plaintiffs satisfied the numerosity requirement.  Further, the Court determined that Plaintiffs satisfied the commonality requirement since the policy at issue was mandated for non-discretionary application to all hiring decisions regard the class members, regardless of whether the candidates applied for positions with different contractors, sub–contractors, or directly with the WMATA.  Id. at *50.  Regarding typicality, the Court concluded that the class representatives’ claims were typical of the class as they addressed each part of the policy with the exception of one policy appendix, for which Plaintiffs did not present a class representative.  Finally, regarding adequacy, the Court rejected WMATA’s argument that the proposed named Plaintiffs were inadequate because they lacked standing, noting the merits of their allegations were not to be considered as part of the class certification calculus.  Id. at *56-57.

Next, the Court analyzed Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a hybrid Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) class.  WMATA argued that Plaintiffs failed to identify which parts of Policy 7.2.3 produced a disparate impact, and their failure to identify the particular challenged employment practice prohibited certification.  Noting that each appendix to the policy constituted a separate employment practice, and that Plaintiffs identified three appendices to the policy that allegedly had a disparate impact on African-Americans, the Court found that Plaintiffs satisfied their burden under Rule 23(b)(2).  Id. at *59-60. 

However, the Court held that Plaintiffs failed to meet the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3) and therefore refused to certify the class for monetary damages.  Id. at *65-66.  Specifically, the Court reasoned that the case involved “more than just the individual determination of damages” – namely, the trier of fact must also determine, for each individual class member, whether that class member was not hired or fired due to the Policy 7.2.3., or for some other reason.  Accordingly, the Court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and certified three classes under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(c)(4) with respect to liability and the availability of injunctive relief.

Implications For Employers

This ruling illustrates that even if a majority of an employer’s workforce is part of a protected class, an employer’s policies potential can still be considered to have a disparate impact on that class for purposes of Rule 23 class certification.  Plaintiffs will likely use this ruling in subsequent motions for class certification in class actions involving the disparate impact of criminal background policies.  As such, employers should be cognizant of the effect of its policies, and continue to ensure they are neutrally applied.

court-northern-district-of-iowaBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., John S. Marrese, and Christopher M. Cascino

Seyfarth Synopsis:  A group of female truck drivers sued their employer for policies allegedly resulting in a hostile work environment for and retaliation against women who complained of sexual harassment on the job.  Under Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa certified both a hostile work environment class and retaliation class on issues relating to the employer’s liability.  Such certification was made possible by the drivers’ bifurcation proposal, which involved a representative trial on aspects of liability and individualized trials on remaining aspects of liability and damages.  Employers should take note that there is a trend among some federal courts to use Rule 23 in novel ways to certify classes of employees to avoid confronting issues that, traditionally, would preclude class certification.

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Class actions are supposed to promote the efficiency and economy of litigation by allowing the claims of a group of individuals with the same claims to be decided in one proceeding.  Many claims brought in the employment context, such as hostile work environment and retaliation claims, are not amenable to class treatment, but some courts have taken an expansive reading of Rule 23 to allow certification of classes even when resolution of the class claims would not resolve the claims of the individual class members.  This is precisely what happened in Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc., No. 15-CV-117 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 30, 2017), where Chief Judge Leonard T. Strand of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa certified classes alleging hostile work environment and retaliation even though individualized trials would be required to establish remaining issues of liability and damages for each individual class member.

Case Background

Plaintiffs, three female truck drivers, brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act against their employer, CRST Expedited, Inc. (“CRST”).  Id. at 3.  CRST employs thousands of truck drivers on two-person teams, so that one driver can sleep while the other drives.  Id.  Plaintiffs alleged that CRST maintained patterns or practices of discrimination amounting to a hostile work environment and retaliation toward female drivers who reported sexual harassment.  Id.

Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that three practices of CRST created a hostile work environment, including: (a) failing to find a harassment complaint corroborated without an admission by the accused himself or a third-party’s eyewitness account; (b) failing to discipline male drivers even when a harassment complaint was corroborated; and (c) tolerating the failure of responsible employees to act promptly in the face of a harassment complaint and instead encouraging the accuser to keep driving with the accused.  Id. at 8-15.

Plaintiffs also alleged that three practices of CRST constituted retaliation against female drivers who reported harassment, including: (a) requiring an accuser to exit the truck upon complaining and thereby precluding her from earning wages by continuing to drive; (b) forcing accusers to cover transit and lodging costs after exiting the truck; and (c) extending student-driver training for those student-driver accusers who were forced to exit the truck after complaining of harassment. Id. at 13-18.

Based on evidence which included testimony from CRST employees and eight female drivers supporting the foregoing allegations, Plaintiffs moved for certification of two classes under Rule 23, including: (a) female drivers subjected to a hostile work environment based on sex (“Hostile Work Environment Class”); and (b) female drivers subjected to retaliation in response to complaints of sexual harassment (“Retaliation Class”).  Id. at 23-24.  Plaintiffs also moved to certify a California-only class of female drivers.  Id. at 24.

The Court’s Decision

In a lengthy opinion, Judge Strand certified the Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation Classes only with respect to particular issues under Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 23(c)(4), but denied certification of the California-only classes.

The Court’s decision to certify the classes depended heavily upon Plaintiffs’ proposal of bifurcating the case into two phases.  Id. at 28, 46.  Under Plaintiffs’ proposal, Phase I – the “liability” phase, as the Court characterized it – would determine whether CRST: (a) created or tolerated a hostile work environment; and (b) retaliated against women based on sex.  If such liability were established, each case would then proceed to Phase II to determine in individual trials whether: (a) each plaintiff subjectively believed the work environment to be hostile (a finding required to prove a hostile work environment claim and, therefore, a part of liability omitted from Phase I’s “liability” trial); and (b) damages.  Id. at 28, 40 n.15.

In finding that liability issues for the Hostile Work Environment Class satisfied Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the Court found that all three of Plaintiffs’ theories of discrimination provided common questions of law and fact which predominated over individual questions affecting the claim.  Id. at 27-39 & 43-48.  The Court emphasized that the fact that Plaintiffs would attempt to prove those theories through one-off accounts of individual employees did not preclude certification.  Id. at 35 (“Plaintiffs’ reliance on anecdotal evidence to establish a pattern or practice does not defeat commonality”) (citations omitted)).

In finding that liability issues for the Retaliation Class also satisfied Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the Court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ theory that CRST retaliated by requiring female drivers to exit the truck after complaining of harassment provided common questions of law and fact that  predominated over individual questions affecting the claim.  Id. at 36-37 & 43-48.  However, the Court determined that Plaintiffs’ two other theories of retaliation – forcing accusers to cover transit and lodging costs and extending student-driver training –  presented too many individualized questions for adjudication by representative evidence, even in a bifurcated trial.  Id. at 37-39.

The Court cited Rule 23(c)(4) in certifying the above classes, which allows a court to certify a class “with respect to particular issues,” as opposed to an entire claim.  Id. at 48. Nonetheless, the Court went on to consider Plaintiffs’ “alternative” request for certification under Rule 23(c)(4) in a separate portion of the opinion.  Id. at 50-52.

In addressing Rule 23(c)(4), the Court noted a circuit split as to whether a plaintiff must show that his entire claim satisfies the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) before certifying particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4), or whether a plaintiff need only show predominance with respect to the particular issue for certification under 23(c)(4).  Id. at 51-52.  The Court opined that while the Eighth Circuit has not yet decided the issue, the Court would follow the Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits in certifying the sufficiently common issues presented by Plaintiffs despite the fact that Plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety did not merit certification.  Id. at 52.

Accordingly, as to the Hostile Work Environment Class, the Court certified the issues of whether CRST had any of the following policies, patterns or practices that create or contribute to a hostile work environment: (1) failing to find their complaints were corroborated without an eyewitness or admission; (2) failing to discipline drivers after complaints were corroborated; and (3) failing to discipline responsible employees for not promptly responding to sexual harassment complaints.  Id. at 55.  As to the Retaliation Class, the Court certified the issue of whether CRST has a policy, pattern, or practice of retaliating against women complaining of sexual harassment by requiring them to exit the truck after complaining.  Id.

In other parts of the opinion, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for hybrid certification of injunctive relief classes under Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 49-50.  The Court also rejected CRST’s arguments against certification based on the Rules Enabling Act and Article III standing.  Id. at 52-54.

Implication For Employers

This case is part of a trend, post-Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), whereby courts have used Rule 23(c)(4) issue certification or an expansive view of Rule 23(b)(3) to sidestep individualized issues that would otherwise preclude certification.  In this case, the Court certified a class claim despite the fact that individual issues of liability as well as damages would remain in individual trials in Phase II under the bifurcation plan at issue.  The Court did not address in great detail whether such a hyper-segmented plan is likely to achieve the efficiency and fairness objectives the class action device was designed to achieve.  In circumstances like this, employers should emphasize the absence of such efficiency and fairness in defending against certification.

supreme court sealSeyfarth Synopsis: Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited decision in McLane Co. v. EEOC, No. 15-1248, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2327 (U.S. 2017), a decision that clarifies the scope of review for employers facing EEOC administrative subpoenas. The Supreme Court held that such decisions are reviewable under the abuse-of-discretion standard, which is a relatively high bar of review. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s ruling clarifies that EEOC subpoenas are subject to a searching, fact-intensive review that does not lend itself to a “one size fits all” approach.

Background

This case arose out of a Title VII charge brought by a woman who worked as a “cigarette selector,” a physically demanding job, requiring employees to lift, pack, and move large bins of products. After the charging party returned from three months of maternity leave, she was required to undergo a physical capabilities evaluation that was required for all new employees and employees returning from leave or otherwise away from the physically demanding aspects of their job for more than 30 days, regardless of reason. The charging party was allowed three times to meet the level required for her position, but failed each time.  McLane then terminated her employment.

The charging party claimed that her termination was because of her gender, and further alleged disability discrimination. During the investigation of her EEOC charge, the Commission requested, among other things, a list of employees who were requested to take the physical evaluation. Although McLane provided a list that included each employee’s gender, role at the company, evaluation score, and the reason each employee had been asked to take the evaluation, the company refused to provide “pedigree information,” relative to names, social security numbers, last known addresses, and telephone numbers of employees on that list. In the process of negotiating the scope of information that would be provided, the EEOC learned that McLane used its physical evaluation on a nationwide basis. The EEOC therefore expanded the scope of its investigation to be nationwide in scope, and also filed its own charge alleging age discrimination.

The District Court refused to order the production of pedigree information, holding that it was not “relevant” to the charge at issue because that information (or even interviews of the employees on the list provided by McLane) could not shed light on whether an evaluation represented a tool of discrimination. EEOC v. McLane Company, Inc., No. 12-CV-02469 (D. Ariz. Nov. 19, 2012) (See our blog post of the District Court’s decision here.)

On October 27, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo and held that the District Court had erred in finding the pedigree information irrelevant to the EEOC’s investigation. EEOC v. McLane Company, Inc., Case No. 13-15126, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 187702 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2015). (See our blog post of the Ninth Circuit’s decision here.)

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the courts of appeals regarding the appropriate scope of review on appeal. The posture of the appeal was somewhat unusual because, after the grant of certiorari, the EEOC and McLane both agreed that the District Court’s decision should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, although the EEOC argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision should stand as a matter of law. The Supreme Court therefore appointed an amicus curiae to defend the Ninth Circuit’s use of de novo review.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that in the absence of explicit statutory command, the proper scope of appellate review is based on two factors: (1) the history of appellate practice; and (2) whether one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.

Regarding the first factor, the Supreme Court noted that abuse-of-discretion review was the longstanding practice of the courts of appeals when reviewing a decision to enforce or quash an administrative subpoena. In particular, the Supreme Court noted that Title VII had conferred on the EEOC the same subpoena authority that the National Labor Relations Act had conferred on the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), and decisions of district court to enforce or quash an NLRB subpoena were reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Regarding the second factor, the Supreme Court held that the decision to enforce or quash an EEOC subpoena is case-specific, and one that does not depend on a neat set of legal rules. Rather, a district court addressing such issues must apply broad standards to “multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization.” McLane Co. v. EEOC, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2327, at *14 (U.S. 2017) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 561-62 (1988)). In particular, in order to determine whether evidence is relevant, the district court has to evaluate the relationship between the particular materials sought and the particular matter under investigation. These types of fact-intensive considerations are more appropriately done by the district courts rather than the courts of appeals.

The Amicus argued that the district court’s primary role is to test the legal sufficiency of the subpoena, which does not require the exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court held that this view of the abuse-of-discretion standard was too narrow. The abuse-of-discretion standard is not only applicable where a decision-maker has a broad range of choices as to what to decide, but also extends to situations where it is appropriate to give a district court’s decision an unusual amount of insulation from appellate revision for functional reasons. Those functional considerations weighed in favor of the abuse-of-discretion standard rather than a de novo standard of review. Because the Ninth Circuit did not apply that standard on appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.

Implications For Employers

The McLane case is important for employers because it clarifies the standard of review that is applied to the review of district court decisions enforcing or quashing EEOC subpoenas. Although the Supreme Court adopted the more “hands off” abuse-of-discretion standard, thus giving even more weight to the district court’s judgment, it did so because it identified the fact-intensive nature of these judgment calls, including important decisions about how difficult it would be for the employer to produce the requested information weighed against the need for that information, and the relationship between the particular materials sought and the particular matter under investigation.

At the very least, this language shows that the EEOC does not get to automatically presume relevance of its administrative subpoenas at the outset, as the EEOC sometimes likes to argue. Rather, employers should be able to cite to language in the Supreme Court’s opinion to reinforce the fact that the district court must give serious consideration to issues of relevancy and burden (also whether the subpoena is “too indefinite” or for an “illegitimate purpose”) when deciding whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena.

Readers can also find this post on our EEOC Countdown blog here.

 

downloadBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Thomas E. Ahlering, and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis:  In a first-of-its kind ruling, an employer recently secured the dismissal with prejudice of what is believed to be one of the first Telephone Consumer Protection Act class actions ever brought against a company while acting as an employer – specifically in this instance, the use of robo-calls to contact applicants about employment opportunities. The ruling ought to be required reading for corporate counsel in order to understand this emerging risk and to craft strategies to protect companies against such claims.

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When most people think of class actions brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), they envision lawsuits against companies using automated voices to tell them they won a free cruise or are eligible to receive a discount on a product.  But in Dolemba v. Kelly Services, Inc., No. 16-CV-4971, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13508 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2017), the Plaintiff, who had previously given her contact information to temporary staffing company Kelly Services, Inc. (“Kelly”) to be contacted regarding employment opportunities, brought a class action against Kelly under the TCPA and Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (“ICFA”) alleging that Kelly made an unauthorized robo-call to her cell phone.  Kelly resisted the claim, filed a motion to dismiss, and Judge Sara Ellis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Kelly’s motion to dismiss both claims with prejudice, finding that the Plaintiff never revoked her consent to be contacted about employment opportunities.

The ruling in Dolemba is believed to be one of the first TCPA class actions ever brought against a company while acting as an employer, thus making this ruling a landmark victory for employers nationwide.  The potential for employers to face similar novel TCPA class actions in the near future is now imminent – and employers can and should add this decision to their arsenal as a powerful tool to help defeat such actions.

Case Background

In March 2007, Plaintiff applied for employment with Kelly, indicating interest in positions using office skills such as accounts payable and accounts receivable.  Id. at *1.  Plaintiff’s employment application included her cellular phone number.  In signing the application, Plaintiff “authorize[d] Kelly to collect, use, store, transfer, and purge the personal information that [she] provided for employment-related purposes.”  Id.  Kelly never offered Plaintiff a job, nor did Plaintiff ever accept employment through Kelly.  She also did not receive any communications from Kelly between the end of 2007 and February 2016.  Id. at *1-2.

On February 27, 2016, Plaintiff received an automated call on her cellular phone from Kelly.  Id. at *1.  Kelly contacted Plaintiff about potential job opportunities.  Because Plaintiff did not answer the call, Kelly left a voicemail message regarding opportunities for employment as a machine operator in the Chicagoland area.  Plaintiff alleged that she had no reason to believe that Kelly still treated her application as active in 2016.  Responding inconsistent with the notion that no good deed goes unrewarded,  Plaintiff brought a class action lawsuit alleging that Kelly violated the TCPA and ICFA by calling her cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system.  As part of its defense strategy, Kelly moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims and strike her class allegations.

The Court’s Decision

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s TCPA and ICFA claims with prejudice.  First, the Court accepted Kelly’s argument that Plaintiff had essentially “pleaded herself out of court” and further found that Kelly met its burden of consent as an affirmative defense.  Id. at *3-4.  Specifically, the Court held that although Plaintiff need not have anticipated or pleaded revocation of consent, she only maintained that she had no reason to believe her employment application was active and she had no further communications with Kelly after consenting to receive employment-related communications.  Id. at *5-6.  Therefore, the Court found that Plaintiff’s consent remained valid at the time Plaintiff filed the case.  Id. at *6.

The Court also rejected Plaintiff’s attempt to “recast her consent” as only agreeing to accept calls relating to specific employment opportunities, holding that “the call [Plaintiff] received clearly related to an employment opportunity.  Although not specifically tailored to the exact job interests [Plaintiff] indicated in her application, it still fell within the broad consent she gave to use her cellular phone number to contact her generally for employment-related purposes regardless of whether that job matched her job interests.”  Id. at *7.  Accordingly, the Court found that because Plaintiff pleaded herself out of court by attaching her employment application, which indicated she consented to receiving calls from Kelly for employment-related purposes, her TCPA claim must be dismissed.

Plaintiff also brought a claim under the ICFA alleging that Kelly engaged in unfair acts and practices by making the allegedly unauthorized robo-call to her cellular phone in violation of §§ 2 and 2Z of ICFA, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2, 2Z.  Id. at *8.  The Court explained that to state an ICFA claim, Plaintiff must allege: (1) a deceptive or unfair act or practice by Kelly, (2) Kelly’s intent that Plaintiff rely on the deceptive or unfair practice, (3) the unfair or deceptive practice occurred in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce, and (4) Kelly’s unfair or deceptive practice caused Plaintiff actual damage.  Id. at *8-9.  In dismissing Plaintiff’s ICFA claim, the Court found  that “receiving one pre-recorded message does not rise to the level of an oppressive practice” and that damages such as “loss of time and loss of battery life” are “so negligible from an economic standpoint as to render any damages unquantifiable.”  Id. at *10.  The Court further rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Kelly violated the Illinois Telephone Act because the message did not solicit the sale of goods and or services and therefore, did not fall under the definition of “recorded message” in the Illinois Telephone Act.  Id. at *10-11.  Accordingly, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s ICFA claims with prejudice.

Implications For Employers

This is a landmark victory for employers, especially companies who utilize automated calls and text messages to contact prospective and/or current employees about job-related opportunities or employment matters.  Employers can almost certainly expect similar lawsuits brought against them under the TCPA.  Fortunately for employers, Kelly’s victory provides a roadmap for how to defeat such cutting edge class actions.

gavel on white backgroundBy Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Mark W. Wallin, and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: A federal court in Tennessee denied the EEOC’s application for an Order to Show Cause why its administrative subpoena should not be enforced.  This ruling highlights the importance and benefits of employers understanding the contours of the charges being investigated by the EEOC, so that the employer can guard against improper fishing expeditions.

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Although courts typically grant the EEOC wide latitude to obtain information regarding its investigations of workplace discrimination, this access is not limitless.  One such limit was recently highlighted in EEOC. v. Southeast Food Services Company, LLC d/b/a Wendy’s, Case No. 3:16-MC-46 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2017 ), where Magistrate Judge H. Bruce Guyton of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied the EEOC’s Application for an Order to Show Cause Why an Administrative Subpoena Should Not Be Enforced (“Application”).  The Court refused to enforce the EEOC’s subpoena, finding that the request for contact information of all of Southeast Food Services Company, LLC, d/b/a Wendy’s (“Wendy’s”) current and former employees, among other things, was not relevant to the individual charge of discrimination being investigated by the EEOC.

This ruling illustrates the importance to employers of understanding the scope of the EEOC charge being investigated, and provides a roadmap for pushing back against agency overreach when the Commission seeks information that is not pertinent to the investigation at issue.

Case Background

In September 2014, Wendy’s hired Christine Cordero as a crew member at one of its restaurant locations.  Id. at 2.  Shortly thereafter, Wendy’s promoted Cordero to crew leader.  Id.  As part of her promotion, Wendy’s requested that Cordero sign a general release of all claims she may have against Wendy’s up to that point, but not including future claims.  Id.  For the past 20 years, Wendy’s had conditioned promotions on signing this release. Id.  Despite not having any claims against Wendy’s, Cordero refused to sign the release.  Id.  As a result of her refusal, Cordero did not receive the promotion, but still received training for the position and a small raise that accompanied the promotion.   Id.

Ms. Cordero continued to work for Wendy’s, but filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in December 2014.  Id.  In the charge, Cordero alleged that Wendy’s retaliated against her by not promoting her due to her refusal to sign the release. Id.  In the course of its investigation of Cordero’s charge of discrimination, the EEOC learned of Wendy’s longtime practice of requiring employees to sign a release of claims as a condition of promotion, and thereafter sent Wendy’s a letter indicating it intended to expand the investigation.  Id.  In this letter, the EEOC also requested information from Wendy’s regarding current and former employees who had worked for Wendy’s since December 2012.  Id.  Wendy’s, however, refused to provide this additional information, and the EEOC then issued a subpoena seeking the same information.  Id. at 2-3.

The EEOC’s subpoena sought the identity and contact information of all current and former employees since December 2012, including employees who signed the release of claims and who had been promoted.  Id. at 3.  In addition, the subpoena sought the employees’ dates of hire, promotion and termination, reasons for termination, and titles, as well as copies of all releases that Wendy’s had employees sign during that period, among other things.  Id.  Wendy’s continued to object, and refused to provide the information subpoenaed.  Id.  Thereafter, on November 18, 2016, the EEOC filed the Application with the Court, to which Wendy’s responded on February 22, 2017.

The Court’s Decision

The Court denied the EEOC’s Application and declined to enforce the subpoena.  The EEOC argued that it “require[d] the contact information for [Wendy’s] employees to mail questionnaires in order to determine if those employees gave up any claim in order to receive promotions.”  Id. at 4.  In response, Wendy’s asserted that the sole issue with regard to the instant charge was whether its uniform policy regarding a signed release as a condition of promotion was sufficient to sustain Cordero’s Title VII retaliation claim, and that the information sought for the questionnaires was neither relevant nor necessary to the EEOC’s investigation.  Id. at 4-5.  Siding with Wendy’s, the Court rejected the EEOC’s argument, finding that “whether other ‘employees gave up any claim in order to receive promotions’ [was] irrelevant to resolving Ms. Cordero’s charge.”  Id. at 5.

The EEOC further argued that sending the questionnaires to other employees was the only way to verify Wendy’s contention that no other employees aside from Cordero refused to sign the release.  The Court again rejected the EEOC’s argument, noting it was “unclear how another employee’s refusal to sign a release ‘might cast light’ on the instant charge, particularly where there is no dispute that for the past 20 years, all employees have been required to sign a general release of all claims as a condition of promotion.”  Id. at 6.  The Court further reasoned that the potential unlawfulness of Wendy’s employment practice was not dependent on how many other employees signed a release.  Id. at 7.  Accordingly, the Court held that the EEOC did not meet its burden in demonstrating that the information subpoenaed is relevant to Cordero’s charge, and declined to enforce the subpoena.

Implication for Employers

In what has become “go-to” play in the EEOC’s investigation playbook, the Commission has been aggressive in taking individual charges of discrimination as means to seek company-wide personnel information from employers through subpoenas.  Employers that encounter requests for expansive personnel data in the course of single employee investigations can add this ruling to their own playbooks in defending against overzealous EEOC investigations.  While the Commission likely will continue to be aggressive in seeking massive amounts of information from employers in investigations, this ruling provides optimism for employers who are willing to firmly oppose such tactics.

Readers can also find this post on our EEOC Countdown Blog here.

200px-NDAla_sealSeyfarth Synopsis: An Alabama district court granted a temporary staffing company’s motion to dismiss all claims in one of the EEOC’s most high-profile lawsuits asserting hiring discrimination and abuse of vulnerable workers. The ruling illustrates the procedural defenses that employers possess to ensure that pre-lawsuit investigations undertaken by the EEOC accord with its obligations under the law.

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A recent mission of the EEOC has been to aggressively pursue lawsuits on behalf of “vulnerable workers” who may not always be aware of their rights. A result of the EEOC’s recent aggressiveness is that the Commission often neglects to fulfill its pre-suit obligations under Title VII and overlooks jurisdictional requirements when racing to the courthouse. These tactics came under scrutiny in EEOC v. Labor Solutions of Alabama, Inc. f/k/a East Coast Labor Solutions, No. 16-CV-1848 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2017), where Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted Labor Solutions of Alabama, Inc.’s (“LSA”) motion to dismiss the EEOC’s complaint. The Court found that the EEOC lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and failed to exhaust its administrative remedies after suing LSA for alleged conduct that occurred by its supposed predecessor before LSA was ever formed.

This ruling is a signal victory for employers involved in EEOC litigation regarding potential successor liability, as well as any employer involved in EEOC litigation where the Commission fails to exhaust its pre-suit duties under Title VII.

Case Background

The EEOC investigated charges of discrimination against a company called East Coast Labor Solutions, LLC (“East Coast”), alleging that East Coast discriminated against the charging parties on the basis of their national origin and failed to accommodate their disabilities. Following its investigation, the EEOC issued East Coast a letter of determination finding reasonable cause to believe that Title VII and the ADA were violated with respect to the charging parties and a class of current and former employees. Id. at 8.  The EEOC thereafter unsuccessfully attempted to conciliate with East Coast.  In November 2013, East Coast ceased operations.  LSA was formed in October 2014.

Despite the fact that LSA was not in existence when the alleged misconduct occurred, the EEOC filed a Complaint alleging that LSA subjected the Claimants to discriminatory treatment based on their national origin and failed to accommodate their disabilities. While East Coast partnered with its owner Labor Solutions (a different entity than LSA), the only Defendant named in the lawsuit was LSA.  Thereafter, LSA moved to dismiss the Complaint because it failed to allege that LSA employed the Claimants, thereby meaning the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under Title VII and the ADA. Id. at 9.  LSA also argued that the EEOC failed to exhaust administrative prerequisites, noting that LSA was not named in the original EEOC charge or in any amendment thereto.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted LSA’s motion to dismiss. First, the Court addressed the EEOC’s argument that it alleged plausible facts to infer so-called “successor liability.” Id. at 11.  After thoroughly examining various Eleventh Circuit precedents regarding successor liability, the Court explained that “[a]lthough the Court agrees with the EEOC that successorship does not have to be conclusively determined at this stage of the litigation, that does not absolve the agency from pleading facts which make its existence plausible.” Id. at 26.

Applied here, the Court determined there were “no facts suggesting substantial (or even any) continuity in business operations from East Coast to LSA. The Complaint contains no allegations that there was any sale of East Coast, or any of its assets, to LSA.”  Id. at 27.  Finding there was no successor liability, the Court further reasoned that East Coast had been defunct nearly an entire year before LSA was formed; there was no allegation that LSA employed substantially the same work force and/or supervisors as East Coast; the Complaint did not allege that LSA operated at the same location as East Coast; there was no allegation as to whether East Coast could have provided relief before or after any alleged sale or transfer; and there was no allegation as to whether LSA could provide any relief now.

The Court further rejected the EEOC’s argument that East Coast and LSA were both temporary staffing agencies and that both entities shared the same managing officers, principal office address, and company email accounts, holding this was not enough to demonstrate continuity when one considered the break in time between when East Coast ceased operations and LSA began. Finally, the Court opined that even if the Complaint had plausibly alleged that LSA was the successor to East Coast, it would still be dismissed since it was undisputed that LSA was not named in the original EEOC charge, or in any subsequent amendment.  Accordingly, the Court granted LSA’s motion to dismiss, but noted the EEOC may file an amended complaint to attempt to cure its deficiencies.

Implications For Employers

For employers with intricate corporate structures and ties to defunct entities, this ruling is a major victory. Employers with corporate officers who previously worked at a similar but defunct entity can use this ruling to as a roadmap to navigate EEOC lawsuits concerning allegations from before their business was ever formed. In sum, this is yet another example of a court pumping the brakes on procedurally improper EEOC litigation.

Readers can also find this on our EEOC Countdown Blog here.

supreme court sealBy Christopher M. Cascino and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seyfarth Synopsis:  A bankruptcy court overseeing an employer’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding allowed the employer to pay certain unsecured creditors before paying Worker Adjustment And Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”) creditors – workers who had sued the company – monies owed pursuant to a judgment, even though the bulk of the WARN monies owed were for back wages that hold priority over other unsecured claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  The bankruptcy court allowed the employer to pay the other unsecured creditors pursuant to a settlement agreement between the other unsecured creditors, the secured creditors, and the employer because, according to the bankruptcy court, the other unsecured creditors would not receive any monies absent the settlement, while the WARN creditors would not recover any compensation under or absent the settlement.  Both the district court and U.S. Court Of Appeals For The Third Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 2024 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the WARN plaintiffs could not recover was questionable and, more significantly, that the bankruptcy court could not alter the Bankruptcy Code’s distribution scheme at the expense of the WARN creditors absent their consent.

Employers undergoing Chapter 11 bankruptcy and WARN litigation should take note that unpaid wage claims will take priority over the claims of other unsecured creditors absent the consent of WARN creditors.

Case Background

Sun Capital Partners (“Sun”), a private equity firm, purchased Jevic Transportation Corp. (“Jevic”), an employer, in a leveraged buyout using monies borrowed from third-party CIT Group (“CIT”).  In the buyout, both Sun and CIT used Jevic’s stock as collateral to finance the purchase.

Two years after the buyout, Jevic declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11.  Immediately prior to filing for bankruptcy, Jevic, without the notice required under WARN, told its employees that it was terminating their employment.  During the bankruptcy, these employees sued, and the bankruptcy court entered a $12.4 million judgment in their favor, making them creditors of Jevic.  The bankruptcy court determined that $8.3 million of this $12.4 million was owed for priority wage claims.  While the WARN creditors argued that Sun was also liable for this judgment as a joint employer with Jevic, the bankruptcy court ultimately ruled against them, finding that Sun was not their employer.

Also during the bankruptcy, other unsecured creditors sued Sun and CIT, arguing that they were the beneficiaries of preferential transfers of Jevic’s assets.  While this lawsuit was pending, Jevic’s assets were depleted to $1.7 million in cash, subject to a lien by Sun, and the preferential transfer lawsuit.

Sun, CIT, Jevic, and the other unsecured creditors decided to settle the fraudulent transfer lawsuit.  At the time the case was settled, the WARN creditors’ joint employer case was still pending, so Sun insisted that any settlement could not include a payment to the WARN creditors or their counsel, as Sun feared the WARN creditors’ counsel would use such payments to fund litigation against Sun.  Under the settlement agreement, CIT agreed to pay $2 million to cover the legal fees and administrative expenses of the other unsecured creditors, while giving Jevic’s remaining $1.7 million to pay taxes, administrative expenses, and pro rata distributions to the other unsecured creditors.  Also pursuant to the settlement, Jevic agreed to dismiss its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.

Sun, CIT, Jevic, and the unsecured creditors petitioned the bankruptcy court to approve the settlement and dismiss the Chapter 11 case.  The WARN creditors opposed, arguing that the settlement violated the normal priority rules by giving other unsecured creditors priority over the WARN creditors.

While the bankruptcy court agreed that the settlement violated standard priority rules, it found that, because it was dismissing the Chapter 11 case rather than approving a Chapter 11 plan, it did not have to follow the priority rules contained in Chapter 11.  It found authority to do so in Chapter 11’s dismissal provision, § 349(b)(1), which provides that, with dismissal, parties are restored to the status quo ante unless a bankruptcy judge, “for cause, orders otherwise.”  Further, it found that, regardless of the settlement, the WARN creditors would not receive any distributions, while the settlement left the other unsecured creditors in a better position than they would be absent the settlement.  Both the district court and Third Circuit agreed.  The WARN creditors sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.

The Court’s Decision

In a March 22, 2017 opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed.  The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering Jevic’s argument that the WARN creditors lacked standing because they would not have recovered anything if the settlement was not approved.  The Supreme Court found this argument unpersuasive because it relied on two questionable propositions: first, that without violation of the ordinary priority rules, there would be no settlement and, second, that the fraudulent conveyance lawsuit had no value.  2017 U.S. LEXIS 2024, at *19.  With respect to the  first argument, the Supreme Court found it unpersuasive given that Sun ultimately won on the joint employer issue.  Id. at *19-20.  With respect to the second, the Supreme Court found the assumption that the fraudulent conveyance lawsuit had no value questionable in light of the fact it settled for $3.7 million.  Id. at *20.  The Supreme Court thus concluded that the WARN creditors had something to lose if the settlement was approved, and therefore had standing to challenge it.  Id. at *21.

The Supreme Court then turned to the question of whether a bankruptcy court can dismiss a Chapter 11 plan in a way that does not follow the ordinary priority rules without the affected creditors’ consent.  Id.  It decided that it cannot for several reasons.

First, the Supreme Court observed that the distribution scheme contained in the Bankruptcy Code is “fundamental to the Bankruptcy Code’s operation,” and that one would expect more than “statutory silence” to authorize departures from the scheme.  Id. at *22-23.  Second, the Supreme Court concluded that Chapter 11 § 349(b)(1), in providing that the parties are restored to the status quo ante in a dismissal unless a bankruptcy judge, “for cause, orders otherwise,” only allows a bankruptcy judge to “make appropriate orders to protect rights acquired in reliance on the bankruptcy case,” which approval of the settlement did not do.  Id. at *24-25.  Finally, the court concluded that the consequences of allowing a departure from the normal distribution scheme were “potentially serious,” including “changing the bargaining power of different classes of creditors” and “risks of collusion.”  Id. at *30-31.

For these reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the bankruptcy court’s approval of a settlement that, as part of the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case, allowed payment to general unsecured creditors while skipping the higher priority claims of the WARN creditors.

Implications For Employers

Financially distressed employers who are the subject of potential WARN litigation should be aware that, as a result of this decision, they will not be able to pay the claims of general unsecured creditors during bankruptcy absent the consent of WARN creditors.  The case has special implications for employers who own distressed employers, as was the case with Sun in Czyzewski, who want to avoid funding litigation against themselves under a joint employer theory.

EEOCWhile the government enforcement lawsuits brought by the DOL and EEOC in 2016 were in line with their aggressive platforms, by sheer numbers of cases, their enforcement activities were arguably limited in their effectiveness, at least when measured by lawsuit filings and recoveries compared to previous years. Settlement numbers for government enforcement litigation in 2016 decreased substantially as compared to 2015, as did the litigation dockets of the DOL and the EEOC. This trends is aptly illustrated by a comparison of settlement recoveries over the past 7 years. Settlement recoveries in 2016 were the second lowest of any year during that period.

Top 10 Government Enforcementsettlement amounts by class action type

This trend is critical to employers, as both agencies have a focus on “big impact” lawsuits against companies and “lead by example” in terms of areas that the private plaintiffs’ bar aims to pursue. The content and scope of enforcement litigation undertaken by the DOL and the EEOC in the Trump Administration remains to be seen; most believe there will be wholesale changes, which may well prompt the private plaintiffs’ class action bar to “fill the void” and expand the volume of litigation pursued against employers over the coming year.

In our sixth, and final, installment outlining the top workplace class action litigation trends from 2016, we analyze the reduced suit filings by government agencies tasked with enforcing workplace regulations, as well as their ambitious enforcement goals and the industries that are most targeted.

 

 

washington-monument-754745_960_720Seyfarth Synopsis: Governmental enforcement litigation was a mixed bag in 2016. The U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) continued their aggressive enforcement programs, but their effectiveness was down “by the numbers” as compared to previous years. What does this mean for 2017?  In the 6th and final installment in our series of blog postings on workplace class action trends, we examine what employers are likely to see in 2017 on the government enforcement litigation front.

Introduction

Government enforcement lawsuits brought by the DOL and EEOC continued the aggressive litigation programs of both agencies, but by sheer numbers of cases, their enforcement activities were arguably limited in their effectiveness, at least when measured by lawsuit filings and recoveries compared to previous years. Settlement numbers for government enforcement litigation in 2016 decreased substantially as compared to 2015, as did the litigation dockets of the DOL and the EEOC. This trends is aptly illustrated by a comparison of settlement recoveries over the past 7 years. Settlement recoveries in 2016 were the second lowest of any year during that period.

Top 10 Government Enforcement

This trend is critical to employers, as both agencies have a focus on “big impact” lawsuits against companies and “lead by example” in terms of areas that the private plaintiffs’ bar aims to pursue. The content and scope of enforcement litigation undertaken by the DOL and the EEOC in the Trump Administration remains to be seen; most believe there will be wholesale changes, which may well prompt the private plaintiffs’ class action bar to “fill the void” and expand the volume of litigation pursued against employers over the coming year.

Governmental Enforcement Litigation Trends In 2016

On the governmental enforcement front, both the EEOC and the DOL intensified the focus of their administrative enforcement activities and litigation filings in 2016.  At the same time, the number of lawsuits filed and the resulting recoveries by settlement – measured by aggregate litigation filings and the top 10 settlements in government enforcement litigation – were less than half of what the EEOC and DOL achieved in 2015.

The EEOC’s lawsuit count dropped precipitously. By continuing to follow through on the systemic enforcement and litigation strategy plan it announced in April of 2006 (that centers on the government bringing more systemic discrimination cases affecting large numbers of workers), the EEOC filed less cases overall but more systemic lawsuits. This manifested the notion that the Commission’s limited budget and bandwidth are best deployed to matters where a systemic focus is most needed and the largest numbers of alleged victims are at issue.  As 2016 demonstrated, the EEOC’s prosecution of pattern or practice lawsuits is now an agency-wide priority backed up by the numbers.  Many of the high-level investigations started in the last three years mushroomed into the institution of EEOC pattern or practice lawsuits in 2016. These numbers are shown by the following chart:

EEOC Systemic Cases: Filed, Resolved, And On Active Docket
FY 2013 – 2016

Cases Filed

The Commission’s 2016 Annual Report also announced that it expects to continue the dramatic shift in the composition of its litigation docket from small individual cases to systemic pattern or practice lawsuits on behalf of larger groups of workers.  The EEOC’s FY 2016 Annual Report detailed the EEOC’s activities from October 1, 2015 to September 30, 2016.  The EEOC’s Report indicated that:

  • The Commission completed work on 273 systemic investigations in FY 2016, which resulted in 21 settlements or conciliation agreements that yielded a total recovery of $20.5 million for systemic claims; six of the settlements involved 50 alleged victims or more, and 13 settlements included 20 or more alleged victims. The FY 2016 recoveries represent a decrease of systemic recoveries in FY 2015 when the Commission netted $33 million based on resolution of systemic investigations.
  • The EEOC recovered $347.9 million for alleged victims of employment discrimination in FY 2016 through mediation, conciliation, and settlements. This represented a decrease of $10.4 million as compared to FY 2015, when the Commission garnered $356.6 million for its enforcement efforts.
  • For its lawsuits, the EEOC secured $58.3 million in recoveries in FY 2016.  This figure was down $7 million as compared to the FY 2015 recoveries of $65.3 million. However, the EEOC resolved fewer lawsuits than it did last year, and recovered less money from those cases.  Specifically, the EEOC resolved 139 lawsuits during FY 2016 for a total recovery of $52.2 million; by comparison, the EEOC resolved 155 lawsuits in FY 2015 for a total recovery of $65.3 million.
  • The EEOC filed only 86 lawsuits in 2016 (down significantly from the 139 lawsuits it filed in 2015), of which 31 were “multiple victim” lawsuits, with 18 cases involved claims of systemic discrimination on behalf of 20 or more workers, and 13 cases involved multiple alleged discrimination victims of up to 20 individuals.  The EEOC had 165 cases on its active lawsuit docket by year end (down from FY 2015, when it had 218 cases on its docket, of which 48% involved multiple aggrieved parties and 28.5% involved challenges to alleged systemic discrimination).  Overall, this represented increases in these categories in terms of the make-up of the Commission’s litigation being tilted more heavily toward systemic cases.
  • The EEOC also received 91,503 administrative charges of discrimination, which was slightly up from the FY 2015 total of 89,385 charges and the FY 2014 total of 88,778 charges. Thus, charge activity was one of the heaviest in the 52 year history of the Commission.
  • The EEOC also encountered significant criticism in the manner in which it enforced anti-discrimination laws.  This criticism took various forms in terms of judicial sanctions, suits against the Commission by private litigants and States, and questioning by Congress over the EEOC’s alleged lack of transparency.

While the inevitable by-product of these governmental enforcement efforts is that employers are likely to face bigger lawsuits on behalf of larger groups of workers in 2017, the EEOC’s systemic litigation program is not without its detractors.  Several federal judges entered significant sanctions against the EEOC – some in excess of seven figures – for its pursuit of pattern or practice cases that were deemed to be without a good faith basis in fact or law. The U.S. Supreme Court in EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1642 (2016), examined the propriety of the $4.7 million fee sanction, the largest fee sanction ever leveled against the Commission; while the EEOC had been successful in its initial appeal in reversing the sanction before the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the EEOC’s position, remanded the fee sanction issue for review, and gave new life to the employer’s efforts to recoup millions of dollars against the Commission.

Fiscal year 2016 also marked another year in the EEOC’s 2012-2016 Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”).  The SEP was created in 2012 as a blueprint to guide the EEOC’s enforcement activity.  Its most controversial and perhaps most far-reaching effect on the agency’s activity is the priority it gives to systemic cases: those pattern or practice, policy, or class-like cases where the alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an industry, profession, company, or geographic area.  Systemic cases have been the main driver of EEOC litigation over the past few years, and likely will be well into the future.  The EEOC is now fighting challenges to its power to bring those cases on a number of fronts.  Among other things, it is aggressively challenging any court’s ability to review how it conducts certain statutorily-mandated procedures before bringing suit, including how it investigates its cases and tries to conciliate those cases with employers.  If successful in those efforts, the EEOC will have greatly eased its path to pursuing systemic cases.

The EEOC is not only expanding its reach in procedural terms, but also it is attempting to broaden the scope of its authority through an expansion of the scope of anti-discrimination laws themselves.  In a number of recent cases, the EEOC has advanced novel legal theories that would, among other things, expand anti-discrimination protections to cover transgender employees and require employers to reasonably accommodate pregnant employees, even those who are experiencing normal pregnancies.  The EEOC continued to push the edge of the legal envelope in 2016, viewing itself as an agency that not only enforces the law, but also one that expands the scope of those laws as it deems appropriate.

For this and other reasons, the agency has come under increasing scrutiny and criticism by Republican members of Congress, business groups, and critics of an allegedly activist agency wasting the taxpayers’ dollars.  Such criticism is unlikely to stem the tide of systemic cases or deter the EEOC from continuing to try to expand its enforcement powers.  Subject to policy-directed changes mandated by the Trump Administration, employers can expect the EEOC will use the next year to continue to push for expansion of its procedural and substantive limits.

The DOL also undertook aggressive enforcement activities in 2016.

The Wage & Hour Division (“WHD”) kept up its aggressive enforcement actions in 2016, particularly in the hotel, restaurant, and retail industries.  Much of WHD’s enforcement and other activities took place under the umbrella of “fissured industries” initiatives, which focus on industries with high usage of franchising, sub-contracting, and independent contractors.  At the conclusion of those enforcement actions, WHD continued to increase its use of civil money penalties, liquidated damages, and enhanced compliance agreements.

Legislatures and government agencies in various states and municipalities also increased their activities on the wage & hour front.  Whether increasing the minimum or living wage, enacting scheduling laws and ordinances, implementing wage theft prohibitions, or increasing the minimum salary level required for exemption, many have already revised or are actively planning to revise laws and rules governing how businesses pay employees in 2017.

With the approaching ten-year anniversary of the last time Congress enacted a minimum wage increase (2007), advocates of a minimum wage increase are likely to turn up the volume on their requests for an increase to the federal minimum wage in 2017.  This may well depend on the politics of the debate, for the incoming Republican Administration appears opposed to such an increase.

Finally, if history is a guide, the incoming Administration is likely to return to the decades-old practice of issuing opinion letters in response to specific requests, which had been abandoned by the Obama Administration’s decision-makers at the DOL.

Over the past several years, the DOL’s Wage & Hour Division (“WHD”) fundamentally changed the way in which it pursues its investigations.  Suffice to say, the investigations are more searching and extensive, and often result in higher monetary penalties for employers. According to the DOL, since early 2009, the WHD has closed 200,000 cases nationwide, resulting in more than $1.8 billion in back wages for over 2 million workers.  In FY 2016, the WHD collected more than $266.5 million in back pay wages, an increase of $20.5 million over the past year. Hence, in 2016, employers finally saw the impact of these changes on the WHD’s enforcement priorities, and 2017 is apt to bring much of the same absent a stark change in priorities under the Trump Administration.

The DOL also focused its activities in 2016 on wage & hour enforcement on what it terms “24/7.” The WHD’s Administrator, Dr. David Weil, was an architect of the WHD’s fissured industry initiative.  This initiative focuses on several priority industries, including food services (both limited service/full service establishments), hotel/motel, residential construction, janitorial services, moving companies/logistics providers, agricultural products, landscaping/horticultural services, healthcare services, home healthcare services, grocery stores, and retail trade.  In FY 2016, the WHD reported recoveries of $143,274,845 for nearly 19,000 workers within these fissured industries.

Not to be outdone, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) undertook an ambitious agenda in 2016 too.  It reconsidered well-settled NLRB principles on joint employer rules and representative elections, entertained the possibility of extending the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) to college athletes, and litigated novel claims seeking to hold franchisors liable for the personnel decisions of franchisees. More than any other area impacting workplace litigation, the NLRB also remained steadfast in its view that workplace arbitration agreements limiting class or collective claims are void under § 7 of the NLRA. It pursued a myriad of unfair labor practice charges against employers for alleged violation of the NLRA for use of arbitration agreements with class action and collective action waivers.

Implications For Employers In 2017?

So what are employers likely to see in 2017 on the government enforcement litigation front? In the early days of the Trump Administration, clear direction on litigation policy remain unclear. Most pundits believe that employers can expect less litigation and less regulation than during the Obama Administration. Furthermore, the phenomenon of “regulation by enforcement litigation” is likely no longer the by-product of the DOL and the EEOC’s enforcement litigation programs. Most likely, control of agency budgets may well provide the lever that the Trump White House may use to force its policy choices upon the government enforcement litigation programs of the DOL and the EEOC.