By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Lauren E. Becker

Seyfarth Synopsis: The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey recently issued a ruling with respect to Defendants’ “compelling” exhaustion argument that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to their disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of Title VII claims relied on to support their motion for class certification, as those claims were outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ underlying EEOC charges. In rejecting Defendants’ argument, the Court invited Defendants to raise their argument more appropriately on a motion for summary judgment. The decision is an important one for employers facing employment discrimination class actions.

Case Background

In Smith v. Merck & Co., No. 13-CV-2970, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129126 (D.N.J. July 31, 2018), a former Merck & Co. employee filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated employees, alleging that Merck violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and other state and federal laws. Id. at 2. After receiving a Right-To-Sue Notice from the EEOC, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against Merck & Co. raising claims consistent with those alleged in her EEOC charge.

Plaintiff twice amended her Complaint.  First, she added several more named plaintiffs, each of whom had filed administrative charges with the EEOC on behalf of a class. The Second Amended Complaint added named Defendants, Merck Sharp & Dohme, Corp. and Intervet, Inc., and fourteen causes of action.  Id. at 3.

Plaintiffs moved for class certification based on disparate treatment and disparate impact. Defendants filed their own motion for partial judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which permits a party to secure a dismissal after the pleadings close without delaying trial. Id. at 6. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with regards to the disparate impact and disparate treatment claims, as required by Title VII, because those claims were not supported by the pleadings or underlying EEOC charges. Id. at 5. Instead, Defendants argued that the disparate impact and treatment claims were “newly asserted challenges,” based on at least four policies that Plaintiffs obtained and learned about during discovery. Id. at 4. At the EEOC charge stage, Plaintiffs had not asserted disparate treatment by evidencing a facially neutral policy that adversely impacted Plaintiffs. Id. Instead, Plaintiffs’ EEOC charges asserted discrimination exclusively based on the actions of individual managers. Id. Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim failed, Defendants’ argued, because neither the EEOC charges nor the Complaint supported “discrimination based on high-level facially neutral policies that Merck allegedly implemented to discriminate” against Plaintiffs. Id. at 5.

Plaintiffs argued that the EEOC charges supported their motion for class certification, the requirements of which “are separate from, and more stringent than, the administrative exhaustion standard for Title VII cases.” Id. at 5.

The Court’s Decision

On July 31, 2018, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, without ruling on the exhaustion defense. Id. at 9.

First, the Court addressed the standard by which courts in the Third Circuit determine a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 6. Specifically, the Court viewed all facts and inferences garnered from the pleadings in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and would grant Defendants’ motion only where it “clearly establish[ed]” that there were no remaining issues of material fact. Id.

Then the Court articulated Title VII’s exhaustion requirements. Id. at 7-9. Specifically, before filing a Title VII action in federal court, plaintiffs first must exhaust administrative remedies by filing an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and then either resolving the claim with the EEOC or obtaining a right-to-sue letter. Id. at 7. According to the Court, these “essential” elements of Title VII’s “statutory plan” are designed to promote judicial efficiency and provide employers adequate notice of the claims that may be filed against them. Id. at 7-8.

To rule on Defendants’ exhaustion argument, the Court opined that it would have to assess the appropriate scope of the federal court action, as defined by the EEOC’s investigations into Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 8.  Specifically, the Court would have to assess whether Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment and disparate treatment claims “should have been included in a reasonable investigation conducted by the EEOC, based upon the information contained in the Charge.” Id. at 8-9. If found to be outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ EEOC claims, then Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with respect to the disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, which rendered those claims insufficiently ripe to be heard by the Court. Id.

The Court declined to conduct the exhaustion analysis as Rule 12(c) prohibits consideration of separate motion papers when determining a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 9. Nonetheless, the Court indicated a willingness to consider Defendants’ “compelling” exhaustion argument, if raised on Defendants’ own motion for summary judgment, which it characterized as the “appropriate procedural vehicle.” Id. at n. 3.

Implications For Employers

The Court, if it chose to do so, could have converted the motion on the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment sua sponte.  Alternatively, it could have decided the motion under Rule 12(c) because the matters outside of the pleadings are public record.  Nonetheless, the Court’s recognition of Defendants’ “compelling” exhaustion argument is significant because it indicates the Court’s likely ruling, if and when Defendants pursue the argument in a motion for summary judgment.

Employers and class action attorneys should pay close attention to the scope of discrimination litigation at the class certification stage, particularly where Plaintiffs’ raise claims in federal litigation that fall outside the scope of those raised in support of an administrative charge of discrimination before the EEOC.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: A federal district court in Kansas recently granted the EEOC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in an ADA lawsuit brought against UPS and an employee union, holding that a policy in Defendants’ collective bargaining agreement where drivers who are disqualified for medical reasons can only be compensated at 90% of their rates of pay for temporary non-driving jobs, while drivers disqualified for non-medical reasons such as DWI’s are compensated at a 100% rate, was facially discriminatory.

This ruling should serve as a wake-up call to employers in regards to ensuring their policies relative to medical disqualifications and compensation are ADA-compliant.

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Case Background

In EEOC v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-2453, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125625 (D. Kan. July 27, 2018), the EEOC brought suit under the ADA regarding UPS’s collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with its employees’ union, which provided that for employees with CDL’s (commercial drivers’ license) whose CDLs are suspended or revoked for non-medical reasons, including convictions for driving while intoxicated, those employees would be reassigned to non-CDL required (non-driving) work at their full rate (100%) of pay. However, for drivers who become unable to drive due to medical disqualifications, including drivers who are individuals with disabilities within the meaning of the ADA, UPS provided full-time or casual inside work at only 90% of the rate of pay.

The EEOC argued that the language of the CBA established a prima facie case of a discriminatory policy because it paid drivers disqualified for non-medical reasons 100% of their pay rate, while paying drivers disqualified for medical reasons 90% of the appropriate rate of pay for the work being performed. Id. at 5. UPS responded by arguing that judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate because: (1) the EEOC relied upon a selective and erroneous interpretation of the CBA; (2) the CBA contained ambiguities that precluded judgment; (3) “whether the CBA works to the benefit or detriment of a medically disqualified driver depends entirely on the particular factual scenario in each case,” which required the Court to engage in a case-by-case analysis to determine if an employee has been discriminated; and (4) the CBA did not limit the opportunities available to individuals with disabilities, but provided additional opportunities beyond what the ADA required. Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted the EEOC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

First, the Court held that the CBA’s language was plain and unambiguous, and further, that it was “immaterial whether medically disqualified drivers have other options; paying employees less because of their disability is discriminatory under any circumstance.” Id. at 5-6. Further, the Court held that the alleged ambiguities that precluded judgment in the EEOC’s favor were attempts to create confusion where none existed. Specifically, the Court opined that UPS’s arguments were “red-herrings because they fail[ed] to address the pertinent issue — pay at less than 100% based on disability.” Id. at 6.

Turning to UPS’s argument that a case-by-case impact analysis was required to show that the policy was facially discriminatory, the Court rejected this argument, explaining that “[a]t the liability stage in a pattern-and-practice claim, the plaintiff must show that unlawful discrimination is part of the employer’s ‘standard operating procedure.’” Id. The Court further explained that under this standard, the government must establish a prima facie case of a discriminatory policy, but it was not required to offer evidence that each individual who may seek relief was a victim of the policy. As such, the Court held that the EEOC met its burden in establishing that the CBA was facially discriminatory.

Finally, the Court rejected UPS’s argument that he CBA did not limit the opportunities available to individuals with disabilities. The Court instead held that UPS did not provide a legitimate reason for paying medically disqualified drivers performing “inside work” less than those disqualified for other reasons under the CBA, and therefore failed to overcome the EEOC’s prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 7.

In regards to injunctive relief, the Court held that the EEOC demonstrated that its claim warranted a permanent injunction. Id. at 7-8. Noting that monetary damages cannot prevent future harm, the Court opined that “[t]he only ‘hardship’ UPS Freight will suffer is paying medically disqualified drivers more (100% pay rate), which is the same rate it already pays its other, non-disabled employees.” Id. at 8. After further holding that the public interest will not be harmed by a permanent injunction prohibiting UPS from discriminating on the basis of disability, the Court ordered the next collective bargaining agreement is to prohibit the same discriminatory practice. Accordingly, the Court granted the EEOC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and thereby granted its motion for injunctive relief.

Implications For Employers

For employers who provide alternative work assignments to employees with medical disqualifications, this ruling should serve as an eye-opener. It is crucial that businesses examine the compensation for such employees to confirm they are not being compensated at a disproportionally lower rate than other non-medically disqualified employees who are reassigned. Accordingly, a best practice for employers is to routinely examine their policies regarding medical disqualification and compensation to ensure they are complying with the ADA, in order to prevent EEOC-initiated litigation.

Readers can also find this post on our EEOC Countdown blog here.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Michael L. DeMarino

Seyfarth Synopsis:  In an opinion laced with frustration over a third appeal in a class action involving attorneys’ fees, the Seventh Circuit ruled that an objector was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees from class counsel’s fee award. “Unless the parties expressly agree otherwise,” the Seventh Circuit explained, “settlement agreements should not be read to bar attorney fees for objectors who have added genuine value.” The Seventh Circuit’s recent ruling in In Re Southwest Airlines Voucher Litigation is a good reminder for companies negotiating class settlements to account for objector fees in settlement agreements up front, or run the risk that an objector will sandbag the settlement by requesting fees later.

The Background Of The Decision

In In Re Southwest Airlines Voucher Litigation, No. 17-3541, 2018 WL 3651028, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2018), the Seventh Circuit addressed the third appeal relating to attorneys’ fees in the settlement of a class action involving Southwest Airline’s cancelled drink vouchers.  In the first appeal, the Seventh Circuit modified class counsel’s fee award because class counsel had failed to disclose a potential conflict of interest. After the appeal, however, class counsel sought a supplemental fee award, along with a 1/5 multiplier, for his time spent appealing – a maneuver the Seventh Circuit called “astonishing.” Id. The district court declined to award the multiplier, but nonetheless awarded class counsel one-third of the requested amount, or roughly $455,294.

Subsequently, an objector, Gregory Markow, sought to vacate the settlement agreement and the supplemental fee award. Markow eventually appealed but then dismissed his appeal in exchange for class counsel’s agreement to take half of the supplemental fee award. The district court approved the new settlement, and Southwest distributed the vouchers and paid class counsel.

Then, in what must have come as a complete surprise to class counsel (and the corporate defendant), Markow sought to recover $80,000 in attorneys’ fees, which were to come out of class counsel’s fee award. The district court denied Markow’s fee request, and Markow appealed that denial.

The Seventh Circuit’s Ruling

In this third appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Seventh Circuit noted that the underlying settlement agreements were silent on issue of objector’s fees. In the absence of a settlement agreement that addresses objector fees, the Seventh Circuit explained that it looks to the law. “Objectors who add value to a class settlement may be compensated for their efforts,” explained Circuit Judge David Hamilton, writing for the unanimous panel. Id. at 2. “Unless the parties expressly agree otherwise, settlement agreements should not be read to bar attorney fees for objectors who have added genuine value.” Id.

Relying on the common fund doctrine to fill in the gap left by the parties’ agreements, the Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded that it would be inequitable for Markow’s lawyer to receive nothing despite negotiating, in exchange for dropping the second appeal, a tripling of relief to the class and a significant cut to class counsel’s fees.

Despite its remand, the Seventh Circuit expressed frustration over resolving yet another appeal involving attorneys’ fees. “[W]e expect this case to end, ‘so that the tail can stop wagging the dog,’” it warned. Id. at *4. (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit determined that it was “difficult to reconcile [class counsel’s] rapacious requests for fees in the district court with our decision in the prior appeal that reduced its already generous fee award as a modest penalty for failing to disclose a potential conflict of interest.” Id.

Implication For Employers

Although objectors are often labeled extortionists by virtue of opportunistic obstacles  they create to securing approval of class-wide settlements, the ruling in In Re Southwest Airlines Voucher Litigation is clear that objectors are entitled to attorneys’ fees when they add value to the class settlement.  Employers navigating class settlements, therefore, should account for objector fees in the settlement agreement. Failure to do so could result in an objector sandbagging the settlement by requesting fees later.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: In a lawsuit brought by a plaintiff class action firm alleging that objectors to class action settlements violated both RICO and Illinois state law by filing frivolous objections in order to seek payouts, an Illinois federal court denied in part the Defendant objectors’ motion to dismiss, holding it had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute and that a claim seeking injunctive relief for the objectors’ unauthorized practice of law could proceed.

In the class action landscape, where serial objectors frequently frustrate the settlement process by requesting payouts in order to withdraw objections, this case is a must-read for employers and class action defense attorneys.

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Case Background

In Edelson PC v. The Bandas Law Firm PC, No. 16-CV-11057, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119305 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2018), Plaintiff – a well-known class action plaintiffs’ law firm – alleged that Defendants regularly filed frivolous objections to class action settlements in order to leverage lucrative payoffs, and that as class action attorneys, they were forced to agree to the payoffs or else encounter significant delays in securing relief for class members. Plaintiff sued Defendants (who also included non-attorneys that allegedly aided the objector law firms by serving as class objectors) for violations of RICO and Illinois state law claims for abuse of process and the unauthorized practice of law, and further sought a permanent injunction under the All Writs Act. Id. at 2.

To say the least, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is novel and a broadside attack on objectors.

Previously, on February 6, 2018, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, and dismissed Plaintiff’s federal RICO claims for failing to allege predicate acts of racketeering. Id. The Court reserved judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims, however, pending further briefing on whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear them. In response to the Court’s order to show cause, Plaintiff argued that its state law claims were properly before the Court under either supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, or traditional diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In response, Defendant argued that supplemental jurisdiction was improper because Illinois courts remained open to Plaintiff and the putative class, and, further, that Plaintiff could not meet the $75,000 amount in controversy threshold required to bring the suit in diversity.

The Court’s Decision

The Court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s state-law claims, and granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s state law claims. First, the Court addressed Plaintiff’s argument that Illinois state courts were closed to many putative class members, and the Court therefore should retain supplemental jurisdiction to avoid unfair prejudice to the putative class as a whole. Id. at 10. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides that any plaintiff whose case is dismissed by a federal district court for lack of jurisdiction may refile his case in state court within one year, “whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires during the pendency of [the federal case].” Id. at 11. Accordingly, the Court held that the supplemental jurisdiction statute did not support continuing jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims.

Next, the Court addressed Plaintiff’s argument that the Court could hear its state-law claims under traditional rules of diversity jurisdiction, which require complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy of more than $75,000. After dismissing several individual Defendants as dispensable parties, Defendants argued that in order for the Court to establish complete diversity, it must dismiss also dismiss any putative class members who are citizens of California or Texas — the states in which remaining the Defendants reside. The Court rejected this argument, noting it was “poorly founded” and that it “is black-letter law that the citizenship of putative class members is irrelevant for diversity purposes.” Id. at 13. After further finding that “there is no serious case to be made that Plaintiff has not put more than $75,000 in dispute,” the Court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Turning to the merits of the state law claims, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants committed the common law tort of abuse of process by manipulating the class-action objection process to serve their own ends. Id. Noting that the tort abuse of process is narrow and disfavored by Illinois law, the Court explained that Plaintiff’s alleged injury — having to pay off Defendants to avoid litigating their objection — was insufficient to establish such a claim. As such, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim.

Plaintiff’s final claim sought an injunction against two of the Defendant attorneys for the unauthorized practice of law pursuant to the Illinois Attorney Act, alleging that the attorneys were ghostwriting the objections and coordinating sham mediation sessions despite not moving for pro hac vice admission or filing appearances in the case involving Plaintiff’s counsel where Defendants had objected. The Court explained that under the Illinois Attorney Act, other attorneys and law firms have standing to sue for such an injunction “[b]ecause the practice of law by an entity not licensed constitutes an infringement upon the rights of those who are properly licensed.” Id. at 18 (citation omitted). Defendants argued that this claim should have been brought in state court, and additionally argued that Plaintiff’s complaint technically did not argue that one Defendant was an unlicensed attorney. Id. at 18-20. The Court rejected these arguments, holding that federal courts could hear such claims, and that Defendants’ “clumsy attempt at linguistic gymnastics ignores the text of the . . . Illinois Attorney Act.” Id. at 21. Accordingly, the Court held that Plaintiff sufficiently stated a plausible claim for the unauthorized practice of law, and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim.

The Court concluded its opinion by opining it was “troubled by the fact that until now its decisions appear to leave Plaintiff and those similarly affected without an adequate remedy — and may fail to deter the Defendants from further rent-seeking [, and] that class counsel facing similar demands may be best served by calling the professional objector’s bluff and seeing the objector’s appeal through to its conclusion.” Id. at 22. But leaving a ray of optimism, the Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has recently transmitted an amendment of Rule 23 to Congress that, if effectuated, would require district court approval before any objector can withdraw an objection or appeal in exchange for money or other consideration.

Implications For Employers

Serial objectors to class action settlements have long frustrated employers and class action litigators by delaying the settlement certification process, and have especially enraged plaintiff-side class action attorneys who must decide whether to pay off the objectors or incur additional time and costs in fighting the objection. While Plaintiff’s RICO and abuse of process claims have now been dismissed in this case, the survival of the unauthorized practice of law clam is significant in that it could result in the Defendant serial objectors from being enjoined to engage in this practice in Illinois. It may also serve as a deterrent to other “professional objectors.”

As such, employers and class action attorneys should pay close attention to developments in this context, as this case and the U.S. Supreme Court’s potential amendment of Rule 23 will undoubtedly have an impact on the class action settlement objection practice that routinely impacts the cost of litigation.  

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Michael L. DeMarino

Seyfarth Synopsis:  In the midst of a legal landscape that is seemingly pro-arbitration, employers should recognize that employees still have a few strategies to oppose arbitration or invalidate an arbitration agreement. The recent ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in Buchanan, et. al. v. Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd., 15-CV-01696 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 2018), is a good reminder for employers that arbitration agreements are still susceptible to challenges like waiver and unconscionability. Employers faced with class actions involving a mix of class members who signed and did not sign arbitration agreements should be careful to preserve their right to enforce the agreements. 

At the same time, this decision in Buchanan is important because it held that a private, individual plaintiff is not entitled to rely on the pattern and practice burden shifting framework articulated in Teams Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977) – an issue that the Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed.

Background:

In Buchanan, et. al. v. Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd., No. 15-CV-01696 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 2018), four plaintiffs sued Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd. (“TCS”), alleging disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that TCS, which is headquartered in India, maintained a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination in its United States workforce by favoring persons who are South Asian or of Indian National Origin. TCS provides consulting and outsourcing services, and plaintiffs claimed that TCS favored individuals who are predominately South Asian when assigning individuals to open client projects. After class certification briefing, the district court certified a class consisting of all individuals “who are not of South Asian race or Indian  nation origin who were employed by [CTS]  . . . and were terminated . . . .” Id. at 6.

After the class was certified, TCS brought a motion to bifurcate the claims of Plaintiff Buchanan from those of other plaintiffs and a motion to compel arbitration. The district court granted both motions.

The Decision

As a threshold matter, the district court held that Plaintiff Buchanan was not entitled to rely on the pattern and practice framework for proving employment discrimination under Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977). Buchanan was not a member of the class because, unlike the class, he was never employed by TCS. Under the Teamsters framework, the burden shifts to the employer to defeat a prima facie showing of a pattern or practice by demonstrating that the plaintiffs’ proof is either inaccurate or insignificant.

Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether an individual private plaintiff may use the Teamsters framework, the district court held that pattern and practice method of proof is not available to private plaintiffs. “To allow this expansion of Teamsters,” the district court reasoned, “would ‘conflict with the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated holding . . . that ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Buchanan, et. al. v. Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd., at 8. Because Plaintiff Buchanan, as an individual private plaintiff, was subject to a different burden shifting framework than will govern the claims of the class, the district court concluded that bifurcating his claims from those of the class would avoid confusion at trial and support judicial economy.

As to TCS’s motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs argued that TCS waived its right to demand arbitration and that the arbitration agreement contained impermissible waiver and unconscionable provisions. Addressing plaintiffs’ waiver argument, the district court concluded that although TCS waited until the fourth amended complaint to assert its right to arbitrate, TCS had notified plaintiffs of its intent enforce the agreement as soon as plaintiffs implicated a potential plaintiff to whom the agreement applied. Hence, the district court concluded that plaintiffs were on notice and granting TCS’s motion would not prejudice plaintiffs.

The district court similarly rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the arbitration agreement contained an impermissible prospective waiver of an employee’s federal anti-discrimination rights. The district court ultimately disagreed that Teamsters pattern and practice burden-shifting framework is a substantive right. The district court likewise rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because of a “selective[] overlay [of] a pro-Defendant subset of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ” Id. at 14. Plaintiffs challenged the arbitration agreement because it did not provide employees the opportunity to file motions to strike or motions for judgment on the pleadings. The district court, however, concluded that these limitations did not rise to the level of unconscionability. It reasoned that “[m]otions to strike are disfavored . . . . and Motions for judgment on the pleadings are easily recast” into motions for summary judgment. Id.

Implication For Employers:

This case is a valuable reminder for employers with arbitration agreements that it is still best practice to avoid acting inconsistent with the right to arbitration, lest you supply plaintiffs with a waiver argument. Employers facing a class mixed with employees who signed and did not sign arbitration agreements should be careful preserve their right to enforce arbitration agreements. This may include notifying plaintiffs of the existence of the arbitrations agreement and your intent to enforce the agreement as soon as a plaintiff enters the case to whom the agreement is applicable.

 

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: In an EEOC-initiated systemic lawsuit alleging that a senior living and nursing facility operator violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by failing to offer employees light duty as a reasonable accommodation and ignoring its obligation to engage in an interactive process, a federal district court in California recently granted in part the employer’s motion to dismiss the claims of eight specifically identified claimants, holding that the EEOC failed to sufficiently allege that these individuals had a disability or could perform essential job functions.

For businesses facing EEOC-initiated litigation relative to disability discrimination, this ruling provides a blueprint for attacking such claims at the pleading stage.

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Case Background

In EEOC v. Prestige Care, Inc., Case No. 1:17-CV-1299, 2018 LEXIS 119305 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2018), the EEOC brought a systemic lawsuit on behalf of thirteen identified claimants for violations of the ADA. Prestige manages nursing care facilities and senior assisted living facilities in California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Arizona. Id. at *3. The EEOC alleged that Prestige implemented and followed policies that violated the ADA, including: (1) a “100% healed/100% fit for duty” return to work policy; (2) not offering light duty as a reasonable accommodation; and (3) ignoring its obligation to engage in an interactive process. Id. The EEOC argued that these policies did not permit reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals.

In its motion to dismiss, Prestige argued that the EEOC’s complaint was deficient as to ten of the thirteen claimants identified by the EEOC since it failed to allege they had impairments that affected a major life activity, or failed to identify essential job functions. Id. Without such allegations, Prestige argued there were no plausible ADA claims with respect to the ten claimants. In response, the EEOC argued that dismissal was inappropriate because the allegations stated plausible claims, including on behalf of unnamed individuals. Further, the EEOC argued that it would be premature to dismiss without the benefit of discovery as to the specific individuals.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted Prestige’s motion to dismiss the EEOC’s claims as to the eight claimants while denying Prestige’s motion as to two claimants. The Court first addressed the EEOC’s arguments (1) that no challenge with respect to claimants was appropriate because it was not a proxy for any individual claimant or charging party; (2) Rule 23 does not apply to the Commission’s lawsuits or when a § 706 claim is pursued; and (3) the EEOC is not required to identify each member of the class to recover. Id. at *5. Noting that “none of these positions adequately address the issue at hand,” the Court explained that Prestige did not argue that Rule 23 applied in this case, nor did it attempt to impose any of Rule 23’s requirements on the EEOC. Further, Prestige did not argue that the EEOC must identify each person for whom recovery is sought. Rather, Prestige was simply raising the question of how to review the allegations concerning the persons that the EEOC chose to identify. As such, the Court held that when the EEOC pursues a systemic claim under § 706 and chooses to identify additional persons who have suffered some form of disability discrimination, the allegations must plausibly show that those “additional individuals” are protected by the ADA. Id. at *6.

The Court then addressed the sufficiency of the allegations as to each of the ten identified claimants that were the subjects of the motion to dismiss. In moving to dismiss the claims of eight of the ten claimants, Prestige primarily challenged the allegations by arguing (1) the EEOC did not identify or allege that a major life activity was affected; (2) the essential functions of the job were not identified; and (3) there were no indications that the aggrieved individual could have performed the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation. Id. at *8-11. For several claimants, the Court held that while the EEOC would identify a physical impairment in its complaint, for instance, plantar fasciitis, it failed to adequately identify a major life activity that was substantially affected by the condition (such as walking or standing, for the claimant with plantar fasciitis). Id. at *17. Regarding the EEOC’s failure to plead the essential job functions, by way of example, the Court noted that for a laundry worker claimant with PTSD and anxiety, the EEOC failed to identify any essential functions of the job, and therefore could not show she was qualified. Id. at *22. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion to dismiss eight of ten identified claimants.

In denying the motion to dismiss as to two of the ten claimants, the Court explained that the allegations were sufficient to plausibly show that the claimants were “qualified individual[s] with a disability.” Id. at *18-19. For instance, the Court held that for a claimant who disclosed a nerve condition that was adversely affected by standing for longer than 15 minutes and lifting heavy objects, the EEOC alleged that Prestige still hired him as a cook, and therefore believed that he could perform the essential functions of that position. As such, the Court held that dismissal of this claimant as a class member would be inappropriate. Id. at *19. Accordingly, the Court denied the motion to dismiss two of the ten claimants.

Implications For Employers

This ruling provides an excellent framework for employers in regards to attacking disability discrimination claims where the EEOC identifies multiple claimants. Employers can rely on the Court’s analyses relative to (1) how the EEOC often failed to identify a major life activity that was substantially affected by the physical impairment it identified; and (2) how the EEOC frequently failed to provide any information whatsoever about essential job functions in its pleading.

But despite dismissing eight of the ten claimants, it is noteworthy that the dismissals were without prejudice. Id. at *22-23. The Court held that the EEOC may file an amended complaint that addresses and corrects the deficiencies with respect to these eight alleged claimants. As such, even though the employer emerged largely victorious in this battle, the Court nonetheless afforded the EEOC a second bite of the apple to remedy its largely deficient pleading.

Readers can also find this post on our EEOC Countdown Blog here.

 

By Christopher M. Cascino and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seyfarth Synopsis: In Pearson v. Target Corp., No. 17-2275, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17337 (7th Cir. June 26, 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took aim at self-serving class settlement objectors and ordered the district court to review whether certain objectors received compensation in exchange for withdrawing objections. While not an employment case, the decision has significant implications for employers involved in class action litigation because it should discourage objectors from delaying class settlement approval by bringing meritless objections solely to receive payment in exchange for withdrawing objections.

Case Background

Nick Pearson brought a consumer protection class action suit in November 2011. Pearson, No. 17-2275, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17337, at *3. The case settled, and the district court approved the settlement on January 22, 2014.  Id. at *3-4.

Theodore Frank, a regular objector to class action settlements that contain “substantial attorneys’ fees but meager benefits for the class,” objected to the settlement on these grounds. Id. at *2. The Seventh Circuit agreed with Frank’s objection and reversed the district court’s decision. Id.

After the case was remanded, the district court approved a new class-wide settlement on August 25, 2016, and dismissed the action without prejudice. Id. at *4. Three objectors subsequently filed objections. Id. All three dismissed their objections before briefing on their objections began. Id. On November 18, 2016, pursuant to a stipulation agreed to by the parties, the district court entered a new order dismissing the class action with prejudice. Id.

Frank – who suspected that the three objectors who withdrew their objections received side settlements in exchange for withdrawing their objections – moved to intervene and disgorge any side settlements paid to the objectors. Id. at *4-5. The district court struck the motion on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction because the action had been dismissed with prejudice. Id. 

Frank then moved to vacate the order dismissing the action with prejudice under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id.  The district court denied the motion, and Frank appealed. Id. at *5.

Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit began by considering whether Frank was “a party” who could file a Rule 60(b) motion. Id. at *6. It concluded that Frank was a party within the meaning of the rule because he objected to the initial settlement. Id.

The Seventh Circuit next considered whether Frank met his burden under Rule 60(b). Frank argued that the district court should have vacated the dismissal with prejudice and restated the dismissal without prejudice based on Rule 60(b)(1), which allows a judgment to be vacated based on “errors by judicial officers as well as parties,” and Rule 60(b)(6), which allows a judgment to be vacated in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at *6.

The Seventh Circuit found that Frank had not met his burden under Rule 60(b)(1) because the dismissal with prejudice was made subject to a stipulation, finding that agreeing to the stipulation was “a strategic decision” that “is enough to support the denial of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion.” Id. at *6-7.

The Seventh Circuit also determined that the district court should have vacated the dismissal with prejudice under Rule 60(b)(6) for two reasons.  First, the Seventh Circuit held that, if a “settlement disappoint[s] expectations,”  especially where there is nothing suggesting that an aspect of a class settlement is fair, courts should vacate under Rule 60(b)(6).  Id. at *9-10.  The Seventh Circuit found those factors present.  Id.

Second, the Seventh Circuit opined that dismissal of a settled class action with prejudice is “inherently problematic” when settlement agreements, like the one at issue, provide that a court will have jurisdiction to determine all matters relating to the settlement agreement. Id. at *11. It found that, by dismissing the action with prejudice, the district court materially altered the settlement agreement, which would have required a new round of notice to absent class members. Id. at *11-12.

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision denying Frank’s Rule 60(b) motion and ordered the district court to consider Frank’s disgorgement motion. Id. at *13.

After rendering its decision, the Seventh Circuit noted its concern that “selfish settlements by objectors are a serious concern.” Id. It noted that concern might be alleviated if Congress approves an amendment to Rule 23 that would require district court approval for “any ‘payment or other consideration’ provided for ‘foregoing or withdrawing an objection’ or ‘foregoing, dismissing, or abandoning an appeal.’” Id. at *13-14.

Implications For Employers

Employers who settle class action lawsuits do so in large part to have certainty and finality. Objectors can stand in the way of that certainty in certain circumstances. While this decision will not end intervention by objectors to class action settlements, it is a shot across the bow of self-serving objectors who bring meritless objections solely in order to extract a payout. Accordingly, it should discourage such meritless objections that can stand in the way of certainty and finality. 

 

Dear Readers,

Happy 4th of July from the Workplace Class Action Blog. We will be on break this week for the holiday and will resume posting our insights on breaking workplace class action news and issues next week.

Best wishes to all for a safe and happy Fourth of July holiday. We hope you have a restful day enjoying family, friends, and loved ones. We will be back soon with all new significant workplace class action observations. Thank you and Happy 4th.

Sincerely,

The Workplace Class Action Blog Writers & Editors

 

On June 21, 2018, XpertHR featured Gerald (Jerry) L. Maatman, Jr. of Seyfarth Shaw LLP as a special guest commentator on its popular podcast series for human resources professionals. In this episode, Jerry provides a comprehensive overview of the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., and the decision’s implications for employers.

In a closely contested 5-4 decision authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Supreme Court held that employers may require employees to sign class action waivers as a condition of employment, and such contacts are unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. In practice, this means that employees who have signed such agreements are obligated to arbitrate workplace disputes individually, rather than as a class or collective action. It is believed that this ruling may affect an estimated 25 million employment contracts, a number that will only continue to rise.

On XpertHR’s podcast, which is hosted by Legal Editor David Weisenfeld, Jerry answers a myriad of key questions about the impact of this decision for employers. David and Jerry touch on important aspects of the ruling such as Justice Ginsburg’s harsh dissent, potential workarounds by the Plaintiff’s bar, the practicality of arbitration agreements for employers, and more. To listen to the full episode, click HERE.

Implications For Employers

The Epic Systems ruling has the potential to immediately influence workplace relations. In fact, the impact of this case is already being seen in courtrooms around the country, with employers incorporating this stance into their arguments against putative employment class actions. Furthermore, as Jerry states in the podcast, the Supreme Court has issued a “mosaic of arbitration decisions” over the past few years that may expand the scope of this ruling beyond just wage & hour cases.

However, though the reading of this decision is pro-business, it may present new complications for employers. For example, the Plaintiff’s bar may adopt the strategy of filing hundreds of individual arbitration claims, a tactic Jerry describes as “death by 1,000 cuts.” Justice Ginsburg’s vociferous dissent can also be interpreted as a plea for Congressional action, though it is difficult to determine the likelihood and proximity of legislative action.

For a full explanation of this case’s impact on employers and HR personnel, make sure to listen to XpertHR’s podcast!

By Christopher M. Cascino and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seyfarth Synopsis: At the start of this week, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, No. 17-432 (U.S. June 11, 2018), which has important implications for employers because it will limit their exposure to successive class actions.  Specifically, the Supreme Court held that, while the individual claims of putative class members are tolled during pending class actions, their class claims are not. 

Case Background

The China Agritech case was the third putative shareholder class action brought against China Agritech alleging fraud and misleading business practices.  The first such action was brought by Theodore Dean on February 11, 2011. On May 3, 2012, the court in Dean denied class certification, and Theodore Dean then settled his individual claim.

On October 4, 2012, a new set of plaintiffs brought the second putative class action, the Smyth action, against China Agritech. The district court again denied class certification, after which the Smyth plaintiffs settled with China Agritech.

On June 30, 2014, Michael Resh filed a third putative class action against China Agritech. China Agritech argued that Resh’s class claims expired on February 3, 2013 under the applicable two-year statute of limitations.  Resh argued that his class claims were tolled during the Dean and Smyth actions under the principles of American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that the filing of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations for all putative class members.

The district court found that American Pipe tolling did not apply to class claims, and thus dismissed Resh’s class claims as untimely.  The Ninth Circuit reversed.  To resolve a circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court began by considering the rationale behind its decision in American Pipe.  Specifically, the Supreme Court observed that the purpose of American Pipe tolling is to avoid putative class members filing motions to intervene or separate, individual suits to protect their claims in the event class certification was denied.  China Agritech, No. 14-432 at *5-6.  The Supreme Court further noted that the efficiency and economy purposes of Rule 23 would be undermined if putative class members needed to file motions to intervene and individual actions to preserve their individual claims while putative class actions were pending.  Id. at *6-*7.

The Supreme Court observed that Rule 23 favors early resolution of class certification questions, in that it Rule 23 states that class certification should be decided at “‘an early practicable time.’” Id. at *7 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)).

The Supreme Court also considered the basis for allowing equitable tolling. Specifically, the Supreme Court pointed out that, to receive equitable tolling, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have “been diligent in the pursuit of their claims.” China Agritech, No. 14-432 at *9. The Supreme Court found that “[a] would-be class representative who commences suit after expiration of the limitation period . . . can hardly qualify as diligent in asserting claims and pursuing relief.” Id.

Finally, the Supreme Court found that the problem with allowing American Pipe tolling to apply to class claims is that “the time for filing successive class suits . . . could be limitless.” Id. at *10. It held that “[e]ndless tolling of a statute of limitations is not a result envisioned by American Pipe.” Id. at *11. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that “[t]ime to file a class action falls outside the bounds of American Pipe.” Id. at *15.

Implications For Employers

While China Agritech is not an employment case, it nonetheless represents an important win for employers because it limits the ability of employees to bring successive class actions on the same claims. If the Supreme Court had ruled that American Pipe tolling applied to class claims, employers who won on class certification in one case could then face successive putative class actions asserting the same claims for an indefinite period of time. Since the Supreme Court ruled that American Pipe tolling does not apply to class claims, employers can now have the certainty of knowing the date on which particular class claims expire.