Seyfarth Synopsis: In Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 15-15260 (11th Cir. Aug. 3, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the deadline for putative class members to appeal the dismissal of class claims was triggered by the filing of a stipulation of dismissal by named plaintiffs and defendant. The decision adds to the growing body of jurisprudence concerning the limits on the ability of absent class members to continue class litigation after named representatives abandon it.
In Love v. Wal-Mart, No. 15-15260, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14261 (11th Cir. Aug. 3, 2017), the Eleventh Circuit addressed the timeliness of putative class members’ appeal of the dismissal of class claims filed more than 30 days after the named class representatives and defendant filed a stipulation of dismissal. Id. at *5.
Putative class members had moved to intervene in the district court not long after the stipulated dismissal was filed. Id. at *4. On the same day their motion to intervene was denied, but 34 days after the filing of the stipulated dismissal, putative class members appealed the denial of the motion as well as the district court’s prior dismissal of the class claims. Id. at *4.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the putative class members’ appeal was untimely pursuant to the 30-day deadline set forth in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”). Id. at *9. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a stipulated dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is effective immediately upon filing, unless its effectiveness is conditioned on a subsequent occurrence. Id. at *6-7. No such condition existed in the stipulated dismissal at hand and, as such, the putative class members’ appeal 34 days after the filing of the stipulated dismissal ran afoul of FRAP 4.
After the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the certification of a nationwide gender discrimination class in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), some members of the putative class in that case filed new, regional class actions against Wal-Mart, including Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Id. at *1-2. Putative class members were able to do so because Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes tolled the statute of limitations with respect to their filing claims with the EEOC, which is a prerequisite to filing a federal discrimination suit. Id. at *3. However, in the Eleventh Circuit, such tolling is limited to individual, not class, claims. Id.
Accordingly, the district court in Love allowed the individual claims of named plaintiffs to proceed, but dismissed the class claims as untimely. Id. The named plaintiffs subsequently settled their individual claims with Wal-Mart. Id.
On October 16, 2015, the named plaintiffs and Wal-Mart filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Id. On October 23, 2015, the district court entered an order acknowledging the stipulated dismissal and dismissing pending motions as moot. Id.
On November 6, 2015, a group of putative class members moved to intervene in the district court solely to appeal the district court’s dismissal of the class claims. Id. at *4. On November 19, 2015, the district court denied the motion to intervene on the grounds that the stipulated dismissal stripped the district court of jurisdiction to hear the motion. Id. That same day, 34 days after the filing of the stipulated dismissal, the putative class members appealed both the denial of their motion to intervene and the dismissal of the class claims. Id.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over the putative class members’ appeal of the dismissal of the class claims because it was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the parties’ stipulated dismissal. Id.
In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the putative class members’ argument that only the named plaintiffs’ appeal deadline was triggered by the stipulated dismissal and that the putative class members’ deadline was not triggered until the district court’s subsequent order on October 23, 2015. Id. at *4-6. The Eleventh Circuit explained that “the plain language of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) requires that a stipulation filed pursuant to that subsection is self-executing and dismisses the case upon its becoming effective, i.e., upon filing unless it explicitly conditions its effectiveness on a subsequent occurrence.” Id. at *6-7 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Without any condition in the stipulation here, the Eleventh Circuit found that the stipulated dismissal was effective upon filing and triggered the putative class members’ 30-day deadline under FRAP 4 to appeal dismissal of the class claims. Id. at *7. The putative class members’ appeal, filed 34 days after the filing of the stipulated dismissal, was therefore untimely. Id. at *8-9.
In turn, although the putative class members’ appeal of the denial of their motion to intervene was timely filed, such an appeal was moot as the putative members had intervened solely for the purpose of appealing the dismissal of the class claims. Id. at *9.
Implication For Employers
This decision is a great victory for the employer. It also offers insight into how an employer can protect itself from continued class litigation after settling individually with named plaintiffs.
In particular, an employer should endeavor to file a stipulation of dismissal in short order because, in certain jurisdictions, the district court may find that the filing of such a stipulation precludes absent class members’ from intervening and pursing class litigation further. Employers should also try to prevent the inclusion of conditions in stipulations of dismissal which delay the effectiveness of such stipulations.
Furthermore, given the application of FRAP 4 here, employers should anticipate receiving notices of appeal from absent class member-intervenors with, or soon after, the filing of their motion to intervene.