By Christopher M. Cascino And Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seyfarth Synopsis: In a major end-of-the-year ruling, employers scored a significant victory in terms of the denial of class certification in a major gender discrimination case that has been closely watched by the media and the bar alike. It underscores the power of U.S. Supreme Court rulings as a bulwark for defending class action litigation.

Introduction

On November 30, 2018, Judge Lorna Schofield of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District Of New York denied certification of a proposed nationwide Title VII class action alleging discrimination on the basis of sex by KPMG. In the decision, Kassman v. KMPG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 3743 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018), the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that KPMG established a framework for managers to exercise their discretion in making compensation and promotion decisions that led to discrimination on the basis of sex. This case represents a significant win for employers as the Court rebuffed a novel attempt to create commonality out of discretionary decision-making after the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). It also provides further guidance to employers about how to make pay and promotion decisions in a manner that avoids potential class action lawsuits.

Case Background

On June 2, 2011, Plaintiffs filed suit against KMPG, alleging that it discriminates against women in making pay and promotion decisions. Id. at 1. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Wal-Mart, which the Court characterized as “provid[ing] a roadmap to avoid class certification of a nationwide class asserting gender discrimination.” Id

After the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart, KPMG utilized a decentralized system for determining pay and promotions. Id. at 2.  However, that decentralized system still had a structure. Id. Among other things, compensation decisions were made under the direction of a National Director of Compensation Strategies within a framework designed to pay KPMG employees at the appropriate market rate. Id. at 2, 5-6. Additionally, KPMG also conducted performance reviews within a framework containing standards for, among other things, years of experience necessary for particular promotions. Id. at 7-9.

Plaintiffs argued that the framework within which KPMG made decentralized compensation and promotion decisions led to discrimination against women on both a disparate impact and disparate treatment basis. They moved for certification of a nationwide class, a New York State class, and a collective action.

The Court’s Decision

The Court first analyzed Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim.  Unsurprisingly, it began with an analysis of Wal-Mart.  It observed that, under Wal-Mart, discretionary pay and promotion procedures can only satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23 if decision-makers operate under “a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company, such that individual discretionary decisions nonetheless produce a common answer to the question ‘why was I disfavored.’”  Id. at 35 (quotation marks omitted).  The Court found that the appropriate way to analyze if such a common mode of exercising discretion was present is to analyze four factors, including: “(1) the nature of the purported class; (2) the process through which discretion is exercised; (3) the criteria governing the discretion and (4) the involvement of upper management.”  Id. at 36.

Applying the first factor, the Court opined that the large size of the putative class – at least 10,000 women – and the fact it was located across the country weighed against a finding of a common mode of exercising discretion. Id. at 36-37. The Court observed that it is much more difficult for a common mode of exercising discretion to exist when decisions are being made by large numbers of decision-makers across the country. Id. at 37.

Turning to the second factor, the Court considered whether the framework within which pay and promotion decisions were made weighed in favor of finding that a common mode of exercising discretion existed. The Court found that “KPMG’s pay and promotion procedures act more as a framework that dictates who will make discretionary decisions rather than how they will exercise their discretion.” Id. at 38. While finding that pay ranges were set at a company-wide level, the Court reasoned that the fact that compensation decisions were made within that range weighed against a finding that a common mode of exercising discretion existed. Id.

The Court next analyzed whether the criteria governing the discretion weighed in favor of finding that a common mode of exercising discretion existed.  Id. at 41.  It observed that “whether a set of criteria creates a common mode of exercising discretion depends on the rigidity of the criteria. Subjective criteria, prone to different interpretations, generally do not provide common direction.”  Id.  Finding that the criteria applied by KPMG, such as “‘professionalism,’ ‘integrity,’ ‘reputation’ and potential to be a ‘partner candidate’” were “amorphous” and thus weighed against a finding that a common mode of exercising discretion existed.  Id. at 42.

Finally, the Court analyzed the fourth factor of “the involvement of top management in the discretionary decision-making.” Id. The Court determined that Plaintiffs’ argument that all pay and promotion decisions must ultimately be approved by two individuals unpersuasive because there was no evidence that these two individuals were doing anything other than approving aggregate promotion and pay numbers rather than at an individual level. Id. at 43. Accordingly, the Court noted that the fourth factor also weighed against a finding that a common mode of discretion existed. Id

With all four factors weighing against such a finding, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had not established commonality and denied class certification of Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim. Id. at 43-44. 

Turning to Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim, the Court held that Plaintiffs did not show that their statistical evidence demonstrated disparate treatment because Plaintiffs had not shown that promotion policies and practices were uniform across KPMG as required to make statistical evidence relevant under Wal-MartId. at 46-47.  The Court further found that Plaintiffs’ argument that KPMG ignored evidence of gender discrimination did not comport with the record, and that their anecdotal evidence was insufficient to show intentional discrimination.  Id. at 48-50.  Accordingly, the Court denied certification of Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim. Id.

Finally, the Court denied certification of a New York state class because Plaintiffs did not provide any evidence of New York state-specific practices, and it denied certification of an Equal Pay Act collective action because Plaintiffs failed to prove the members of the putative collective action worked in a single establishment and that they were similarly-situated. Id. at 51-60.

Conclusion

This case represents a significant win for employers. After Wal-Mart, plaintiffs’ lawyers have tried to develop new theories to secure certification of classes even where decisions are made in a decentralized manner. In Kassman, the Court not only rebuffed the latest such attempt, but also provided employers with additional ways to structure their pay and promotion policies to avoid potential class actions.

 

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christopher J. DeGroff, Matthew J. Gagnon and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth SynopsisOn November 15, 2018, the EEOC released its annual Performance and Accountability Report (‘PAR”) for Fiscal Year 2018 (here) – a year-end report card of sorts, and a critical publication for employers to consider as they analyze the EEOC’s activities over the past year, and its anticipated direction for the future.

In its first year under the Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2018 through 2022 (“Strategic Plan” or “Plan”) (blogged about here), the EEOC reported significant increases in its outreach efforts and enforcement actions, as it highlighted new intake procedures, extensive training programs, and aggressive litigation.  Particularly noteworthy was the EEOC’s track-record relative to workplace sexual harassment litigation, which has become a top priority as the #MeToo movement has spotlighted the issue. 

The 2018 PAR is a “must read” for corporate counsel, as it provides valuable insights into the agency’s mission, as well as warnings that employers should heed. 

Raking In Recoveries

In FY 2018, the EEOC recovered more than $505 million for alleged discrimination victims.  This represents a significant jump from $484 million in FY 2017 (see more here), and $482.1 million in FY 2016 (see more here).  But while the total monetary relief figure ballooned, the relief obtained through mediation, conciliation, and settlement declined from $355.6 million in FY 2017 to $354 million in FY 2018.  Conversely, litigation recoveries jumped to $53.6 million in FY 2018 from $42.4 million in FY 2017 (the FY 2016 and 2015 numbers were $52.2 million and $65.3 million respectively, more closely mirroring this year’s figures).

Firing Up The Filings

The EEOC reported filing 199 merits lawsuits in FY 2018, a slight uptick from the 184 merits lawsuits it filed in FY 2017.  This included 117 suits on behalf of individuals, 45 non-systemic suits with multiple victims, and 37 systemic suits.  The EEOC labels a case “systemic” if it “has a broad impact on an industry, company or geographic area.”

For employers, the 37 systemic lawsuits is a particularly noteworthy figure.  In FY 2017, the Commission filed 30; in FY 2016 it filed 18; and in FY 2015 it filed 16.  The acceleration in systemic lawsuits illustrates that the EEOC is not backing down on its agenda of aggressively litigating “bet-the-company” cases.  Given the heightened financial exposure in systemic litigation, this is one trend employers should certainly heed.

Making Its Mark In The #MeToo Movement

Workplace harassment has never been more in the forefront of the EEOC’s focus than it is today.  The EEOC’s PAR emphasized that it reconvened the Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace for a public meeting, “Transforming #MeToo into Harassment-Free Workplaces,” to examine difficult legal issues and to share innovative strategies to prevent harassment.  The Commission reported that it recovered a whopping $70 million for the victims of sexual harassment through administrative enforcement and litigation in FY 2018, up dramatically from $47.5 million in FY 2017.  Unquestionably, given the increased visibility of workplace sexual harassment based on various high-profile media coverages in 2018, the Commission has turned up the heat on investigations and litigation in this area.

Balancing The Backlog

For several years, the EEOC has been working through its significant backlog of pending charges.  As EEOC Acting Chair Victoria Lipnic noted in the PAR, “[s]oon after I became Acting Chair in 2017 I made addressing the backlog a priority, and as an agency, we began to share strategies that have been particularly effective in dealing with the pending inventory, while ensuring we are not missing charges with merit.”  Chair Lipnic has made good on her word, noting the EEOC dramatically reduced its pending inventory in FY 2018 to 49,607 charges, a decrease of 19.5% from FY 2017 and 34% from FY 2015.  One area that remains ripe for improvement, however, is the backlog of Freedom of Information Act requests, as the PAR reports that the EEOC’s FOIA backlog increased by 185% at the end of FY 2017, but only decreased by 7% in FY 2018.

Portal To The Future

As part of its mission to facilitate the intake process, the launch of a nationwide online inquiry and appointment system as part of the EEOC’s Public Portal resulted in a 30% increase in inquiries and over 40,000 intake interviews.  These figures come as a result of the Commission’s recent commitment to enhance its Digital Charge System and allow technological advances to ease the burden caused by an increased volume of activity.

The Commission additionally noted that its outreach programs reached more than 398,650 workers, employers, their representatives and advocacy groups this past fiscal year at more than 3,900 events conducted by the EEOC.  This reflects the EEOC’s commitment to preventing workplace harassment through proactive measures, while simultaneously increasing public awareness about the mission of the Commission.

Implications For Employers

There were those who believed the EEOC’s enforcement efforts would downshift under the current administration.  Our year end reports, and the EEOC’s own PAR report card, demonstrates quite the opposite.  The EEOC has made it clear that it is ramping up across the board, not slowing down.  This includes a significant increase in filings, recoveries, and outreach efforts.  The EEOC’s PAR is a helpful resource for employers to chart the danger areas in today’s tumultuous political and social environment.  We will continue to report on the EEOC’s enforcement trends.  Stay tuned.

Readers can also find this post on our EEOC Countdown blog here.

By: Mark Wallin, Christopher DeGroff, and Gerald Maatman, Jr.

Seyfarth Synopsis:  The EEOC operates with limited resources, yet has the daunting responsibility of enforcing an alphabet soup of anti-discrimination laws.  The EEOC has become quite savvy at leveraging the press as a pulpit for publicizing its agenda, especially in litigation.  An employer need only visit the EEOC’s website to understand the role of media statement’s in the Commission’s enforcement process.

In the life-cycle of EEOC initiated litigation, the agency will almost invariably issue two media statements: one issued when the suit is filed, and another when the suit is resolved.  But not all media statements are the same.  Depending on the posture of the case, whether the case theories align with the EEOC’s strategic goals, and even how the EEOC views the employer, media statements can vary dramatically.  This post discusses what employers can expect from these releases, including typical language, elements, and timing.   

EEOC’s Publicity Philosophy

The EEOC has acknowledged that press coverage is part of its deterrent message and mission.  Notably, the Commission’s 2006 Systemic Task Force report provides that the “EEOC engage[s] in high impact litigation and publicity efforts that change the workforce status of affected groups and/or improve employment policies, practices, or procedures in affected workplaces.”  (See also opening statement of Sen. Alexander regarding the Commission’s apparent strategy, in filing certain lawsuits, to “achieve a maximum amount of publicity.”)

The EEOC’s litigation media statement is one of the tools in the Commission’s toolbox that it will wield with an aim to achieve its strategic enforcement goals.

Often Two Media Statements During The Course Of EEOC Initiated Litigation

In the life of a lawsuit initiated by the EEOC, there will ordinarily be two media statements. The first will be published when the suit is filed, and the second if the case is resolved.  Although all media statements published upon filing of a suit will have roughly the same cadence and tone, those published upon resolution can vary greatly.

Initial Media Statement

A media statement issued at the outset of the litigation tends to have a stern tone, regarding the alleged actions of the employer.  The statement will lead off with a general assertion of the legal claims lodged against employer, including the statute at issue.  For example, the statement may declare that a female employee suffered through a hostile work environment at the hands of her supervisor, in violation of Title VII.  The statement will then go on to recite the key allegations of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation proffered in the complaint.  These allegations are often delivered as fact, not issues that will be proven – or not – during the litigation.  Often times the statement will also describe the employer, perhaps sharing a website, states of operation, and a brief description of the work done by the business. Finally, the applicable District Director and/or one of the trial attorneys for the matter will offer a quote in the nature of a sound bite concerning the allegations, which will emphasize the Commission policy underlying its prosecution of the lawsuit.  In the most recent batch of EEOC filings, for instance, which occurred in September, combating sexual harassment and discrimination (“me too”) is the most common EEOC policy articulated. It is not surprising that many employers who have been the subject of the EEOC’s media statements have deemed the Commission’s tactics to be unfair and designed to apply extra-judicial pressure to settle litigation.

Media Statement Upon Resolution

When a suit is resolved, typically through an agreed upon consent decree (but occasionally after a rare trial win), the EEOC will publish yet another media statement.  The tone and content of this statement, however, can vary from highly aggressive to fairly measured, and can even verge on “friendly.”  The direction taken by the EEOC in this statement will depend largely on the resources devoted to the litigation, how contentious the litigation was, as well as whether the claims and allegations at issue align with the Commission’s strategic goals.  Some insight into the Commission’s process can be found in the Regional Attorney’s manual, published here. Notably, before the resolution of “significant litigation” a Regional Attorney is required to advise the Office of the General Counsel.  The Commission defines “significant” to mean a lawsuit “expected to involve significant monetary or injunctive relief”; “a favorable jury verdict or court decision”; or resolution which “is likely to receive national or significant local attention due to the notoriety of the defendant, ongoing media interest in the lawsuit and/or issues involved, or other factors that may have spurred significant media scrutiny.”  Whether or not the litigation is deemed “significant” may well play a role in the tone of the media release as well.

The more resources expended, and the more closely aligned the claims are with the Commission’s strategic goals, the more likely the EEOC will publish an aggressive media statement.  The hallmarks of such a statement will be not only the recitation of the most salacious of the allegations, but also a detailed description of the monetary and programmatic relief obtained in the consent decree.  For example, in a recent matter involving an Illinois restaurant, the EEOC’s media statement set forth that “numerous employees … were routinely sexually harassed by coworkers and managers, including offensive sexual comments, groping, physical threats, and, in one instance, attempted forced oral sex with a management employee.” The statement went on to detail the programmatic relief, followed by harsh admonishments from a Regional Attorney and District Director, specifically:

“Employers are responsible for preventing workplace harassment – and their failure to do so hurts both their employees and their bottom line,” said Andrea G. Baran, Regional Attorney for the EEOC’s St. Louis District. “Business owners and CEOs must be proactive and involved in making sure all managers and employees understand that harassment will not be tolerated, harassers will be punished, and those who report harassment will be protected from retaliation. Prevention starts at the top.”

Moving down the spectrum, the Commission may take a more measured tone where the litigation is less protracted and the claims are not necessarily consistent with its strategic goals. For instance, in a recent ADA case settled by the EEOC concerning an employer’s alleged discriminatory termination of a disabled employee, which had been pending less than a year, the media statement provided scant details concerning the claims brought. Further, after a short description of the programmatic relief contained in the lone statement of a Regional Attorney was far more benign:

“This settlement is both strong and just,” said Rudy Sustaita, regional attorney for the EEOC’s Houston District Office. “[The employer] has given us every indication that it intends to comply with the ADA in the future.”

And on occasion, it will even boarder on “friendly” — including a statement of appreciation to the employer for its cooperation in resolving the litigation. In a suit brought in Wisconsin, filed and settled within five months, the Commission was quoted as stating:

“We thank [the employer] for its commitment to settle this case before the sides incurred significant costs and its willingness to ensure a level playing field for its pregnant employees seeking job modifications, including light duty work, otherwise available to non-pregnant employees,” said EEOC Chicago Regional Attorney Gregory M. Gochanour. “The EEOC will continue to enforce the federal laws so that all pregnant employees have the same opportunities as non-pregnant employees to contribute to our thriving economy,” said Julianne Bowman, the EEOC’s District Director for the Chicago District Office.

Although “friendly” media statements are the exception, not the rule, the EEOC is more likely to publish such a statement to incentivize other employers to similarly resolve enforcement actions.

A Word On Conciliation Media Statements

Historically, the EEOC has generally issued media statements for lawsuits only, as conciliation is intended to be a confidential process.  Indeed, one of the chief reasons for employers to engage in pre-suit conciliation is the carrot of confidential resolution.  Interestingly, however, we have seen a trend of the EEOC issuing presumably agreed-upon media statement for matters settled in conciliation.  Accordingly, the employer has a degree of leverage in negotiating these publications.  As one might imagine, conciliation media statements are, thus, more positive in tone. Further, on occasion, the employer may also make a statement, which at minimum disclaims any liability — something rarely, if ever, allowed in a litigation media statement.

Elements Of A Media Statement

Regardless of the tone, EEOC media statements are consistent in their basic elements and structure.

First, there will be a headline crafted to be eye-catching, such as “Paramount Mailing Company Punished Female Employees for Complaining About Abuse, Federal Agency Charges.”  Below is a word cloud, highlighting the most common words and phrases employed by the EEOC in its 2018 headlines.  Not surprisingly, in the current environment, “Sexual” and “Harassment” play prominently.

Second, the media statement will include a statement of claims, describing the complained of discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation, including factual and legal allegations.  The more aggressive press releases will set forth the most sensational and detailed allegations, whereas the measured versions may state the allegations in more bland terms, which can sometimes be so vague that it is difficult to divine what the claims were based upon in the first place.

Third, the Commission will include quotes from the relevant District Director and possibly a Regional Attorney involved in the litigation.  The tone of the EEOC’s quotes can vary greatly, depending on, among other things, the importance of the issue to the Commission’s strategic goals, the duration of the litigation, and resources expended.  Excluding conciliation media statements, on very rare occasions, the EEOC may allow a quote from the employer on the resolution of the lawsuit.  Although it is unlikely the Commission will agree to such a statement, if the litigation and settlement proceed amicably, it is certainly worth attempting to negotiate the point.

Finally, the media statement will conclude with a statement of the EEOC’s mission (e.g. “The EEOC advances opportunity in the workplace by enforcing federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination”).  Additionally, where applicable, the statement will indicate where the resolved litigation is among the EEOC’s strategic goals — “[p]reventing workplace harassment through systemic litigation and investigation is one of the six national priorities identified by the Commission’s Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP).”  Media statements that make note of the SEP are more likely to be among the more aggressive.

Emerging Issues With Media Statements

As the Commission media strategy has evolved, it has made continued efforts to increase its audience and distribution of these statements for maximum effect. The EEOC has also been known to conduct press conferences announcing a new suit or trumpeting an EEOC victory. But now the EEOC also publishes many of its media statements on social media, like Twitter.  It has also taken to issuing relevant media statements in multiple languages depending upon the employees and employer at issue. For as long as the EEOC places a priority on publicity, it will no doubt continue to search for new ways to increase their audience.

Implications for Employers

For employers who find themselves involved in an EEOC enforcement action, it is important not to lose sight of the Commission’s use of its media statement as both carrot and stick.  The EEOC places considerable value on shining a spotlight on its enforcement efforts, especially those which advance its strategic goals.  While it is unlikely that the Commission will allow the employer too much say in the issued statement, when negotiating resolution with the EEOC, where possible, employers should use the Commission’s goal of publicity as a possible bargaining chip to achieve the best possible outcome for the inevitable media statement.  Moreover, by understanding the Commission’s strategic goals, employers will gain a greater awareness of what tone and tenor the EEOC’s statement will take upon resolution, and can prepare accordingly.

 

Readers can also find this post on our EEOC Countdown blog here.

By Christopher J. DeGroffMatthew J. Gagnon,  Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Kyla J. Miller

Seyfarth Synopsis: The uncertainty of a new administration’s impact on the EEOC that plagued FY 2017 is fading, but the results are not what some would expect. Not only has the EEOC brought a mountain of filings compared to the last four years, but also the agency has demonstrated a clear focus on sex-based discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace in light of #MeToo, even surpassing FY 2017 numbers.

With a full fiscal year under its belt, the Trump Administration’s impact on EEOC-initiated litigation is still uncertain. With two Republican Commissioners and the General Counsel position still unconfirmed, it is difficult to discern if things will truly be “business as usual” under Trump or if those appointments, once confirmed, will change agency course. One thing is certain: the EEOC’s litigation program is not slowing down any time soon. Just as the waning months of FY 2017 showed a marked increase in filings, FY 2018 turned up the heat even more. Filings are up more than ever, with sex discrimination filings and #MeToo filings – i.e., complaints of sexual harassment – eclipsing previous years.

The total number of filings in FY 2018 demolished FY 2015 and 2016, and even surpassed FY 2017. (Compare here to here and here). This year, the EEOC filed 217 actions, 197 merits lawsuits and 20 subpoena enforcement actions.

Predictably, the EEOC waited until the last minute to push filings, with this past month showing the most filings compared to any other month this fiscal year. At the time of publication, 84 lawsuits were filed in September, including 45 in the last 3 days alone.  Notable this year, however, was the “ramp up” period in June, July and August, which accounted for 63 of the total filings. Almost half of those cases were brought in August. The total filings for the remaining months remain low, with the number of filings in October through February failing to hit double digits.

Filings in Chicago, Philadelphia and Los Angeles continue to top the charts, with 21, 21, and 17 total filings, respectively. These numbers remain relatively consistent to FY 2017, which showed 21 filings in Chicago, 19 in Philadelphia, and 22 in Los Angeles. On the lower end, the St. Louis and Memphis numbers were modest, with only 7 filings in St. Louis and 8 filings in Memphis. Of the remaining districts, the Phoenix and New York district offices rebounded after a slow FY 2017, each filing 6 more lawsuits in FY 2018 as compared to last year.

Sex Discrimination Takes Center Stage

Each fiscal year we analyze what substantive theories the EEOC is targeting. This year, Title VII claims remained the largest category of filings, on par with FY 2017, which boasted 53% of all filings. In FY 2018, Title VII filings accounted for 55% of all filings. Although FY 2016 showed a dip in Title VII filings at 41%, this year’s Title VII filings beat out FY 2015 and FY 2014 as well.

With a new Strategic Enforcement Plan in place to guide litigation activity for FY 2018-2022, many expected some shift in focus based on two notable changes from the old plan. Specifically, the new plan pledged to address discriminatory practices against those who are Muslim or Sikh, or individuals of Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent. Additionally, the new plan aims to expand the EEOC’s equal pay priority to include compensation discrepancies for race, ethnicity, age, and disability – moving beyond the EEOC’s focus on sex-based pay disparities. In fact, we have actually seen a decrease in Equal Pay Act filings, which could reflect the EEOC’s renewed focus on equal pay issues that affect other protected groups, which would not fall under the jurisdiction of the Equal Pay Act.

One trend has emerged this year – compared to FY 2017, race filings have decreased by 6 filings – with 18 filings in FY 2018 compared to 24 filings in FY 2017.

Perhaps the most striking trend of all is the substantial increase in sex-based discrimination filings, primarily the number of sexual harassment filings. As predicted, #MeToo added fuel to this area of the EEOC’s agenda, with 74% of the EEOC’s Title VII filings this year targeting sex-based discrimination. Compare this to FY 2017, where sex based discrimination accounted for 65% of Title VII filings. Of the FY 2018 sex discrimination filings, 41 filings included claims of sexual harassment. 11 of those filings were brought in the last three days of the fiscal year alone. The total number of sexual harassment filings was notably more than FY 2017, where sexual harassment claims accounted for 33 filings.

EEOC’s #MeToo Harassment Filing Surge

Implications For Employers

The dramatic increase in filings should be an eye-opener for employers in an era when many thought the EEOC might be hitting the brakes. Instead, the EEOC is increasing its enforcement activity, with a particular focus on sex discrimination and sexual harassment. The EEOC still strongly advises employers should update and aggressively enforce their EEO Policies. Now, more than ever, employers need to be on top of their game to avoid becoming the next target of EEOC-initiated litigation.

As most of our loyal readers know, this blog is merely a preview of the more extensive analysis of EEOC trends and developments affecting EEOC litigation that we publish at the end of the calendar year. Stay tuned for our in-depth analysis of FY 2018 filings, and particular danger areas for employers in this shifting political climate.

Readers can also find this blog post on our EEOC Countdown blog here.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seyfarth Synopsis:  As we near the end of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) fiscal year in September 2018, employers and litigators have started to notice an uptick in the Commission’s activity. Specifically, close observers have detected a rise in EEOC filings related to workplace harassment.  In today’s video, Partner Jerry Maatman of Seyfarth Shaw provides an overview of the EEOC’s fiscal year to date, and forecasts what employers can expect to see from the Commission going forward.

Whereas most assumed that the EEOC’s activity would decrease under a more business-friendly Administration, the Commission has actually continued to file lawsuits at a growing rate. For purposes of context, by the end of August 2017, the EEOC had not yet filed 100 merit lawsuits. However, to date this year, the EEOC has already filed 112 merit lawsuits. This number is especially relevant insofar as the Commission has not yet hit its traditional filing peak, i.e., the month of September.  For example, in FY 2017, the Commission filed 88 lawsuits in September alone.

Another key takeaway for employers thus far in FY 2018 concerns the specific allegations of the EEOC’s lawsuits. To date, the EEOC has filed at least 22 lawsuits involving claims of sexual harassment, which is especially significant in light of the #MeToo Movement. Additionally, the EEOC has explicitly stated its priority of “Preventing Systems Discrimination” in at least 10 press releases during FY 2018, including multiple press releases (which can be seen HERE and HERE) touting the Commission’s activity in filing groups of workplace harassment suits in one day. Evidently, these filings suggest that the EEOC’s emphasis on this litigation priority is being escalated in FY 2018.

Implications For Employers

While employers should always be cognizant of their workplace policies, today’s litigation landscape requires human resources personnel to be especially careful regarding their written policies, employee training, and HR reporting procedures. For a full overview of this aspect, be sure to watch Jerry’s explanation in the video above.

Furthermore, despite the current status of EEOC litigation, filing trends can always be significantly altered in the month of September. Remember to stay tuned to our blog, as we will be posting our annual end-of-year EEOC analysis as soon as the Commission’s fiscal year comes to a close!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Lauren E. Becker

Seyfarth Synopsis: The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey recently issued a ruling with respect to Defendants’ “compelling” exhaustion argument that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to their disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of Title VII claims relied on to support their motion for class certification, as those claims were outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ underlying EEOC charges. In rejecting Defendants’ argument, the Court invited Defendants to raise their argument more appropriately on a motion for summary judgment. The decision is an important one for employers facing employment discrimination class actions.

Case Background

In Smith v. Merck & Co., No. 13-CV-2970, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129126 (D.N.J. July 31, 2018), a former Merck & Co. employee filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated employees, alleging that Merck violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and other state and federal laws. Id. at 2. After receiving a Right-To-Sue Notice from the EEOC, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against Merck & Co. raising claims consistent with those alleged in her EEOC charge.

Plaintiff twice amended her Complaint.  First, she added several more named plaintiffs, each of whom had filed administrative charges with the EEOC on behalf of a class. The Second Amended Complaint added named Defendants, Merck Sharp & Dohme, Corp. and Intervet, Inc., and fourteen causes of action.  Id. at 3.

Plaintiffs moved for class certification based on disparate treatment and disparate impact. Defendants filed their own motion for partial judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which permits a party to secure a dismissal after the pleadings close without delaying trial. Id. at 6. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with regards to the disparate impact and disparate treatment claims, as required by Title VII, because those claims were not supported by the pleadings or underlying EEOC charges. Id. at 5. Instead, Defendants argued that the disparate impact and treatment claims were “newly asserted challenges,” based on at least four policies that Plaintiffs obtained and learned about during discovery. Id. at 4. At the EEOC charge stage, Plaintiffs had not asserted disparate treatment by evidencing a facially neutral policy that adversely impacted Plaintiffs. Id. Instead, Plaintiffs’ EEOC charges asserted discrimination exclusively based on the actions of individual managers. Id. Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim failed, Defendants’ argued, because neither the EEOC charges nor the Complaint supported “discrimination based on high-level facially neutral policies that Merck allegedly implemented to discriminate” against Plaintiffs. Id. at 5.

Plaintiffs argued that the EEOC charges supported their motion for class certification, the requirements of which “are separate from, and more stringent than, the administrative exhaustion standard for Title VII cases.” Id. at 5.

The Court’s Decision

On July 31, 2018, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, without ruling on the exhaustion defense. Id. at 9.

First, the Court addressed the standard by which courts in the Third Circuit determine a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 6. Specifically, the Court viewed all facts and inferences garnered from the pleadings in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and would grant Defendants’ motion only where it “clearly establish[ed]” that there were no remaining issues of material fact. Id.

Then the Court articulated Title VII’s exhaustion requirements. Id. at 7-9. Specifically, before filing a Title VII action in federal court, plaintiffs first must exhaust administrative remedies by filing an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and then either resolving the claim with the EEOC or obtaining a right-to-sue letter. Id. at 7. According to the Court, these “essential” elements of Title VII’s “statutory plan” are designed to promote judicial efficiency and provide employers adequate notice of the claims that may be filed against them. Id. at 7-8.

To rule on Defendants’ exhaustion argument, the Court opined that it would have to assess the appropriate scope of the federal court action, as defined by the EEOC’s investigations into Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 8.  Specifically, the Court would have to assess whether Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment and disparate treatment claims “should have been included in a reasonable investigation conducted by the EEOC, based upon the information contained in the Charge.” Id. at 8-9. If found to be outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ EEOC claims, then Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with respect to the disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, which rendered those claims insufficiently ripe to be heard by the Court. Id.

The Court declined to conduct the exhaustion analysis as Rule 12(c) prohibits consideration of separate motion papers when determining a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 9. Nonetheless, the Court indicated a willingness to consider Defendants’ “compelling” exhaustion argument, if raised on Defendants’ own motion for summary judgment, which it characterized as the “appropriate procedural vehicle.” Id. at n. 3.

Implications For Employers

The Court, if it chose to do so, could have converted the motion on the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment sua sponte.  Alternatively, it could have decided the motion under Rule 12(c) because the matters outside of the pleadings are public record.  Nonetheless, the Court’s recognition of Defendants’ “compelling” exhaustion argument is significant because it indicates the Court’s likely ruling, if and when Defendants pursue the argument in a motion for summary judgment.

Employers and class action attorneys should pay close attention to the scope of discrimination litigation at the class certification stage, particularly where Plaintiffs’ raise claims in federal litigation that fall outside the scope of those raised in support of an administrative charge of discrimination before the EEOC.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: A federal district court in Kansas recently granted the EEOC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in an ADA lawsuit brought against UPS and an employee union, holding that a policy in Defendants’ collective bargaining agreement where drivers who are disqualified for medical reasons can only be compensated at 90% of their rates of pay for temporary non-driving jobs, while drivers disqualified for non-medical reasons such as DWI’s are compensated at a 100% rate, was facially discriminatory.

This ruling should serve as a wake-up call to employers in regards to ensuring their policies relative to medical disqualifications and compensation are ADA-compliant.

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Case Background

In EEOC v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-2453, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125625 (D. Kan. July 27, 2018), the EEOC brought suit under the ADA regarding UPS’s collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with its employees’ union, which provided that for employees with CDL’s (commercial drivers’ license) whose CDLs are suspended or revoked for non-medical reasons, including convictions for driving while intoxicated, those employees would be reassigned to non-CDL required (non-driving) work at their full rate (100%) of pay. However, for drivers who become unable to drive due to medical disqualifications, including drivers who are individuals with disabilities within the meaning of the ADA, UPS provided full-time or casual inside work at only 90% of the rate of pay.

The EEOC argued that the language of the CBA established a prima facie case of a discriminatory policy because it paid drivers disqualified for non-medical reasons 100% of their pay rate, while paying drivers disqualified for medical reasons 90% of the appropriate rate of pay for the work being performed. Id. at 5. UPS responded by arguing that judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate because: (1) the EEOC relied upon a selective and erroneous interpretation of the CBA; (2) the CBA contained ambiguities that precluded judgment; (3) “whether the CBA works to the benefit or detriment of a medically disqualified driver depends entirely on the particular factual scenario in each case,” which required the Court to engage in a case-by-case analysis to determine if an employee has been discriminated; and (4) the CBA did not limit the opportunities available to individuals with disabilities, but provided additional opportunities beyond what the ADA required. Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted the EEOC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

First, the Court held that the CBA’s language was plain and unambiguous, and further, that it was “immaterial whether medically disqualified drivers have other options; paying employees less because of their disability is discriminatory under any circumstance.” Id. at 5-6. Further, the Court held that the alleged ambiguities that precluded judgment in the EEOC’s favor were attempts to create confusion where none existed. Specifically, the Court opined that UPS’s arguments were “red-herrings because they fail[ed] to address the pertinent issue — pay at less than 100% based on disability.” Id. at 6.

Turning to UPS’s argument that a case-by-case impact analysis was required to show that the policy was facially discriminatory, the Court rejected this argument, explaining that “[a]t the liability stage in a pattern-and-practice claim, the plaintiff must show that unlawful discrimination is part of the employer’s ‘standard operating procedure.’” Id. The Court further explained that under this standard, the government must establish a prima facie case of a discriminatory policy, but it was not required to offer evidence that each individual who may seek relief was a victim of the policy. As such, the Court held that the EEOC met its burden in establishing that the CBA was facially discriminatory.

Finally, the Court rejected UPS’s argument that he CBA did not limit the opportunities available to individuals with disabilities. The Court instead held that UPS did not provide a legitimate reason for paying medically disqualified drivers performing “inside work” less than those disqualified for other reasons under the CBA, and therefore failed to overcome the EEOC’s prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 7.

In regards to injunctive relief, the Court held that the EEOC demonstrated that its claim warranted a permanent injunction. Id. at 7-8. Noting that monetary damages cannot prevent future harm, the Court opined that “[t]he only ‘hardship’ UPS Freight will suffer is paying medically disqualified drivers more (100% pay rate), which is the same rate it already pays its other, non-disabled employees.” Id. at 8. After further holding that the public interest will not be harmed by a permanent injunction prohibiting UPS from discriminating on the basis of disability, the Court ordered the next collective bargaining agreement is to prohibit the same discriminatory practice. Accordingly, the Court granted the EEOC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and thereby granted its motion for injunctive relief.

Implications For Employers

For employers who provide alternative work assignments to employees with medical disqualifications, this ruling should serve as an eye-opener. It is crucial that businesses examine the compensation for such employees to confirm they are not being compensated at a disproportionally lower rate than other non-medically disqualified employees who are reassigned. Accordingly, a best practice for employers is to routinely examine their policies regarding medical disqualification and compensation to ensure they are complying with the ADA, in order to prevent EEOC-initiated litigation.

Readers can also find this post on our EEOC Countdown blog here.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Michael L. DeMarino

Seyfarth Synopsis:  In the midst of a legal landscape that is seemingly pro-arbitration, employers should recognize that employees still have a few strategies to oppose arbitration or invalidate an arbitration agreement. The recent ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in Buchanan, et. al. v. Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd., 15-CV-01696 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 2018), is a good reminder for employers that arbitration agreements are still susceptible to challenges like waiver and unconscionability. Employers faced with class actions involving a mix of class members who signed and did not sign arbitration agreements should be careful to preserve their right to enforce the agreements. 

At the same time, this decision in Buchanan is important because it held that a private, individual plaintiff is not entitled to rely on the pattern and practice burden shifting framework articulated in Teams Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977) – an issue that the Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed.

Background:

In Buchanan, et. al. v. Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd., No. 15-CV-01696 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 2018), four plaintiffs sued Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd. (“TCS”), alleging disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that TCS, which is headquartered in India, maintained a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination in its United States workforce by favoring persons who are South Asian or of Indian National Origin. TCS provides consulting and outsourcing services, and plaintiffs claimed that TCS favored individuals who are predominately South Asian when assigning individuals to open client projects. After class certification briefing, the district court certified a class consisting of all individuals “who are not of South Asian race or Indian  nation origin who were employed by [CTS]  . . . and were terminated . . . .” Id. at 6.

After the class was certified, TCS brought a motion to bifurcate the claims of Plaintiff Buchanan from those of other plaintiffs and a motion to compel arbitration. The district court granted both motions.

The Decision

As a threshold matter, the district court held that Plaintiff Buchanan was not entitled to rely on the pattern and practice framework for proving employment discrimination under Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977). Buchanan was not a member of the class because, unlike the class, he was never employed by TCS. Under the Teamsters framework, the burden shifts to the employer to defeat a prima facie showing of a pattern or practice by demonstrating that the plaintiffs’ proof is either inaccurate or insignificant.

Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether an individual private plaintiff may use the Teamsters framework, the district court held that pattern and practice method of proof is not available to private plaintiffs. “To allow this expansion of Teamsters,” the district court reasoned, “would ‘conflict with the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated holding . . . that ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Buchanan, et. al. v. Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd., at 8. Because Plaintiff Buchanan, as an individual private plaintiff, was subject to a different burden shifting framework than will govern the claims of the class, the district court concluded that bifurcating his claims from those of the class would avoid confusion at trial and support judicial economy.

As to TCS’s motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs argued that TCS waived its right to demand arbitration and that the arbitration agreement contained impermissible waiver and unconscionable provisions. Addressing plaintiffs’ waiver argument, the district court concluded that although TCS waited until the fourth amended complaint to assert its right to arbitrate, TCS had notified plaintiffs of its intent enforce the agreement as soon as plaintiffs implicated a potential plaintiff to whom the agreement applied. Hence, the district court concluded that plaintiffs were on notice and granting TCS’s motion would not prejudice plaintiffs.

The district court similarly rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the arbitration agreement contained an impermissible prospective waiver of an employee’s federal anti-discrimination rights. The district court ultimately disagreed that Teamsters pattern and practice burden-shifting framework is a substantive right. The district court likewise rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because of a “selective[] overlay [of] a pro-Defendant subset of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ” Id. at 14. Plaintiffs challenged the arbitration agreement because it did not provide employees the opportunity to file motions to strike or motions for judgment on the pleadings. The district court, however, concluded that these limitations did not rise to the level of unconscionability. It reasoned that “[m]otions to strike are disfavored . . . . and Motions for judgment on the pleadings are easily recast” into motions for summary judgment. Id.

Implication For Employers:

This case is a valuable reminder for employers with arbitration agreements that it is still best practice to avoid acting inconsistent with the right to arbitration, lest you supply plaintiffs with a waiver argument. Employers facing a class mixed with employees who signed and did not sign arbitration agreements should be careful preserve their right to enforce arbitration agreements. This may include notifying plaintiffs of the existence of the arbitrations agreement and your intent to enforce the agreement as soon as a plaintiff enters the case to whom the agreement is applicable.

 

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: In an EEOC-initiated systemic lawsuit alleging that a senior living and nursing facility operator violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by failing to offer employees light duty as a reasonable accommodation and ignoring its obligation to engage in an interactive process, a federal district court in California recently granted in part the employer’s motion to dismiss the claims of eight specifically identified claimants, holding that the EEOC failed to sufficiently allege that these individuals had a disability or could perform essential job functions.

For businesses facing EEOC-initiated litigation relative to disability discrimination, this ruling provides a blueprint for attacking such claims at the pleading stage.

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Case Background

In EEOC v. Prestige Care, Inc., Case No. 1:17-CV-1299, 2018 LEXIS 119305 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2018), the EEOC brought a systemic lawsuit on behalf of thirteen identified claimants for violations of the ADA. Prestige manages nursing care facilities and senior assisted living facilities in California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Arizona. Id. at *3. The EEOC alleged that Prestige implemented and followed policies that violated the ADA, including: (1) a “100% healed/100% fit for duty” return to work policy; (2) not offering light duty as a reasonable accommodation; and (3) ignoring its obligation to engage in an interactive process. Id. The EEOC argued that these policies did not permit reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals.

In its motion to dismiss, Prestige argued that the EEOC’s complaint was deficient as to ten of the thirteen claimants identified by the EEOC since it failed to allege they had impairments that affected a major life activity, or failed to identify essential job functions. Id. Without such allegations, Prestige argued there were no plausible ADA claims with respect to the ten claimants. In response, the EEOC argued that dismissal was inappropriate because the allegations stated plausible claims, including on behalf of unnamed individuals. Further, the EEOC argued that it would be premature to dismiss without the benefit of discovery as to the specific individuals.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted Prestige’s motion to dismiss the EEOC’s claims as to the eight claimants while denying Prestige’s motion as to two claimants. The Court first addressed the EEOC’s arguments (1) that no challenge with respect to claimants was appropriate because it was not a proxy for any individual claimant or charging party; (2) Rule 23 does not apply to the Commission’s lawsuits or when a § 706 claim is pursued; and (3) the EEOC is not required to identify each member of the class to recover. Id. at *5. Noting that “none of these positions adequately address the issue at hand,” the Court explained that Prestige did not argue that Rule 23 applied in this case, nor did it attempt to impose any of Rule 23’s requirements on the EEOC. Further, Prestige did not argue that the EEOC must identify each person for whom recovery is sought. Rather, Prestige was simply raising the question of how to review the allegations concerning the persons that the EEOC chose to identify. As such, the Court held that when the EEOC pursues a systemic claim under § 706 and chooses to identify additional persons who have suffered some form of disability discrimination, the allegations must plausibly show that those “additional individuals” are protected by the ADA. Id. at *6.

The Court then addressed the sufficiency of the allegations as to each of the ten identified claimants that were the subjects of the motion to dismiss. In moving to dismiss the claims of eight of the ten claimants, Prestige primarily challenged the allegations by arguing (1) the EEOC did not identify or allege that a major life activity was affected; (2) the essential functions of the job were not identified; and (3) there were no indications that the aggrieved individual could have performed the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation. Id. at *8-11. For several claimants, the Court held that while the EEOC would identify a physical impairment in its complaint, for instance, plantar fasciitis, it failed to adequately identify a major life activity that was substantially affected by the condition (such as walking or standing, for the claimant with plantar fasciitis). Id. at *17. Regarding the EEOC’s failure to plead the essential job functions, by way of example, the Court noted that for a laundry worker claimant with PTSD and anxiety, the EEOC failed to identify any essential functions of the job, and therefore could not show she was qualified. Id. at *22. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion to dismiss eight of ten identified claimants.

In denying the motion to dismiss as to two of the ten claimants, the Court explained that the allegations were sufficient to plausibly show that the claimants were “qualified individual[s] with a disability.” Id. at *18-19. For instance, the Court held that for a claimant who disclosed a nerve condition that was adversely affected by standing for longer than 15 minutes and lifting heavy objects, the EEOC alleged that Prestige still hired him as a cook, and therefore believed that he could perform the essential functions of that position. As such, the Court held that dismissal of this claimant as a class member would be inappropriate. Id. at *19. Accordingly, the Court denied the motion to dismiss two of the ten claimants.

Implications For Employers

This ruling provides an excellent framework for employers in regards to attacking disability discrimination claims where the EEOC identifies multiple claimants. Employers can rely on the Court’s analyses relative to (1) how the EEOC often failed to identify a major life activity that was substantially affected by the physical impairment it identified; and (2) how the EEOC frequently failed to provide any information whatsoever about essential job functions in its pleading.

But despite dismissing eight of the ten claimants, it is noteworthy that the dismissals were without prejudice. Id. at *22-23. The Court held that the EEOC may file an amended complaint that addresses and corrects the deficiencies with respect to these eight alleged claimants. As such, even though the employer emerged largely victorious in this battle, the Court nonetheless afforded the EEOC a second bite of the apple to remedy its largely deficient pleading.

Readers can also find this post on our EEOC Countdown Blog here.

 

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Alex W. Karasik

Seyfarth Synopsis: A federal district court in Maryland recently denied in part an employer’s motion to dismiss a race discrimination action brought on behalf of African-born security guards by the EEOC, and instead granted the EEOC’s motion to stay so that the Commission could amend its deficient pre-suit letters of determination that were the subject of the employer’s motion to dismiss.

This is an important ruling for employers facing systemic EEOC actions, particularly regarding the strategy to challenge whether the EEOC has satisfied its Title VII pre-suit obligations.

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Case Background

In EEOC v. MVM, Inc., No. 17-CV-2864, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81268 (D. Md. May 14, 2018), the EEOC alleged that MVM subjected a group of African-born employees to national origin discrimination, consisting of disparate treatment, a hostile work environment, and unlawful retaliation. Id. at *1. In October 2013, MVM hired a new project manager to oversee 400 security personnel, approximately half of whom were “African or foreign-born blacks.” Id. at *2. Within weeks of his hire, the project manager allegedly began complaining that there were “too many Africans” on the contract, that he was not comfortable working with foreigners, that he “couldn’t understand their accents.” Id.

During the project manager’s tenure, MVM also allegedly engaged in a variety of negative actions against African and foreign-born black security personnel, including denying them leave, forcing them to work on their scheduled days off, forcing them to work extra hours beyond their scheduled shifts, assigning them to undesirable posts, subjecting them to heightened scrutiny, disciplining them more harshly than called for by its discipline policy, intimidating and threatening them with termination, and denying them union representation so as to facilitate the imposition of discipline, suspensions, and termination without cause. Id. at *2-3.

Nine terminated employees filed charges with the EEOC. After the EEOC investigated the Charging Parties’ complaints, it issued Letters of Determination (“LODs”) on November 3, 2016, finding that there was reasonable cause to believe MVM had violated Title VII by discriminating against the Charging Parties through “unequal, terms, conditions, and privileges of … employment because of … national origin,” and/or had retaliated against the Charging Parties for engaging in protected activity. Id.

Following unsuccessful conciliation, on September 27, 2017, the EEOC brought suit on behalf of the Charging Parties and a group of allegedly aggrieved individuals. As amended, the complaint alleged five counts of violations of Title VII, consisting of: (I) a pattern or practice of discriminatory treatment based on national origin; (II) disparate terms and conditions of employment based on national origin; (III) a hostile work environment based on national origin; (IV) discharge and constructive discharge based on national origin; and (V) unlawful retaliation.

In its motion to dismiss, MVM primarily argued that the amended complaint contained claims of disparate treatment on behalf of a group of aggrieved individuals, including claims of discriminatory termination and constructive discharge, which went beyond the scope of the underlying LODs. MVM also argued: (i) discrimination based on “perceived” national origin was not cognizable; (ii) that certain allegations in the amended complaint were based on incidents that do not rise to the level of “adverse employment actions”; (iii) that the EEOC failed to state a plausible claim for constructive discharge; and (iv) that the EEOC failed to state a plausible claim of retaliation arising from the termination of one employee. Id. at *10. In its motion to stay, the EEOC requested that the Court stay the proceedings for 45 days to afford it an opportunity to amend its LODs and engage in conciliation efforts based on the amended LODs.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted the EEOC’s motion to stay, and denied most of MVM’s motion to dismiss. First, in addressing the EEOC’s motion to stay, the Court noted that in the absence of a stay, either the Court would have to engage in detailed, fact-based analysis of the adequacy of the LODs, or the EEOC would dismiss and re-file the case. Id. at *14. In support of staying the case, the Court noted that its conclusion was supported by Mach Mining v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 645 (2015). Specifically, the Court held that “MVM’s rigid position that the EEOC may have only one opportunity to provide notice of charges through its LOD is inconsistent with … Mach Mining … to allow additional opportunities to provide notice of charges and engage in conciliation, precisely the steps that the EEOC seeks to accomplish through its proposed stay.” Id. at *13. Accordingly, the Court granted the EEOC’s motion to stay.

Next, having granted the motion to stay in order to permit the EEOC to amend the LODs, the Court held that MVM’s request for dismissal of claims that were not specifically identified in the LODs, such as discriminatory termination, was now moot. Id. at *16. Turning to MVM’s motion to dismiss claims alleging discrimination on the basis of “perceived” national origin, the Court likewise denied MVM’s motion, holding that “[t]o conclude otherwise would be to allow discrimination to go unchecked where the perpetrator is too ignorant to understand the difference between individuals from different countries or regions, and to provide causes of action against only those knowledgeable enough to target only those from the specific country against which they harbor discriminatory animus.” Id. at *17, 21. 

The Court next addressed MVM’s motion to dismiss any disparate treatment claims based on allegedly discriminatory actions other than suspension or termination. MVM asserted that any freestanding claims of disparate treatment in other specific matters, such as denying leave to African employees, forcing them to work on their scheduled days off, or assigning them to undesirable posts, necessarily failed because those actions did not constitute adverse employment actions for purposes of Title VII. The EEOC argued that it was making no such discrete claims, but rather, that the various discriminatory acts short of suspension and termination that were referenced in the amended complaint were offered collectively to establish a hostile work environment. Id. at *25. The Court rejected the EEOC’s argument and granted MVM’s motion to dismiss the nation origin disparate treatment claim, noting that hostile work environment, discriminatory termination, and retaliation claims were separately plead in other counts. The Court also denied MVM’s motion to dismiss constructive discharge and retaliation claims, holding that the EEOC plausibly stated claims for both. Accordingly, the Court denied in part and granted in part MVM’s motion to dismiss, and granted the EEOC’s motion to stay.

Implications For Employers

Since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in the Mach Mining case in 2015, whether the EEOC has fulfilled its pre-suit obligations under Title VII has become a major area of focus for employers EEOC lawsuits. Here, although the Court generally acknowledged that the LODs were deficient, it avoided closely scrutinizing these pre-suit letters and allowed the EEOC to amend any deficiencies. Accordingly, while employers should not let one district court’s opinion deter them from challenging whether the EEOC fulfilled its pre-suit obligations, they should be cognizant that some courts will be more forgiving in allowing the EEOC to revisit failures to meet these obligations, as opposed to outright dismissing EEOC lawsuits.